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From Arms Race to Marketplace: 
The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System 
Colleen V. Chien* 
For years, high-tech companies have amassed patents in order to deter patent litigation. 
Recently, a secondary market for patents has flourished, making it more likely that patents 
that would otherwise sit on the shelf will end up in the courtroom. This Article explores the 
current patent ecosystem, which includes both “arms race” and “marketplace” paradigms, 
in depth. I distinguish “patent-assertion entities,” entities that use patents primarily to obtain 
license fees rather than to support the development or transfer of technology, from other 
types of non-practicing entities. I contrast the patent arms race, whose goal is to provide 
entities with the freedom to operate, with the marketplace, through which entities have 
leveraged their freedom to litigate. I detail the participation of product companies as well as 
non-practicing companies and their intermediaries in the marketplace, and trace the diverse 
“pathways” traveled by patents from a diversity of sources including failed startups and 
product companies like Micron, to entities like Round Rock and Intellectual Ventures. 
Several implications follow. First, the failure of the patent arms race to deter lawsuits from 
patent assertion entities as well as practicing companies in certain cases means that defensive 
strategies must be reconceptualized to include new tactics—including prevention, disruption, 
and coordination—for securing freedom to operate. In addition, if stockpiles of unused 
patents patent continue to fall into the hands of patent-assertion entities, defensive patenting 
may ironically have the net effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, litigation risk. 
Second, conventional notions of patent value need to be revised. The same patent has a 
much greater “exclusion value”—which I define as the value likely to be extracted from the 
patent—when held by a patent-assertion entity rather than a company vulnerable to 
countersuit. A better understanding of what drives the exclusion value rather than the 
intrinsic value of a patent might help companies predict and potentially avoid technical 
areas where patent assertion is most likely. Finally, recent history suggests trying to change 
the system by changing patentee behavior directly, rather than only through legal changes, 
for example by encouraging quality patenting, improving coordination between patent 
defendants, and creating a nonprofit organization to accept patent donations in order to 
encourage companies to make their unused patents available to the public, rather than to 
patent-assertion entities. 
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Introduction 
Among the many reasons high-tech companies get patents, one of 
the most important is to build a patent arsenal. To guard against the risk 
of patent litigation, companies acquire patents so they can retaliate 
against or neutralize threats of suits brought by their competitors. A 
large patent portfolio is likely to discourage such threats in the first 
place. As companies seek to outdo their rivals and to minimize the risk of 
ending up in court, the acquisition of even more patents is justified. 
Companies seeking freedom to operate have obtained thousands of 
patents as part of the “patent arms race.”1 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs 
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255 (2009) 
(reporting on surveys that confirm that companies in high-tech industries amass patents as bargaining 
chips against other patentees and to prevent suits by others); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham 
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor 
Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101 (2001) (examining the propensity of semiconductor firms 
to obtain patents despite their ineffectiveness in appropriating returns to research and development 
(“R&D”)); James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 4 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/ 
swpat.pdf (providing empirical accounts of the apparent “arms race” in the semiconductor and 
software industries); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 26–
27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/cohen-survey.pdf (“[P]revention of suits [is] one of the most 
Chien_62-HLJ-297 (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2011 2:27 PM 
300 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:297 
Against this backdrop, the patent system has recently witnessed the 
rise of the patent marketplace.2 Over the past few years, thousands of 
patents have changed hands3 as defunct companies, independent 
inventors, corporations, and others have sold their assets to those in a 
better position to exploit them. The most visible buyers of patents have 
been “patent-assertion entities,” which I define as entities that use 
patents primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the 
development or transfer of technology.4 These entities generally use their 
patents to sue, or threaten to sue, practicing companies. They are 
invulnerable to patent counterattack and therefore have little to lose 
from patent litigation besides legal fees.5 
Together, the “arms race” and “marketplace” paradigms define 
what I call “the complex patent ecosystem.”6 An understanding of how 
this ecosystem operates within high-tech industries is critical, as these 
industries have suffered the most from the problems of patent backlog 
and “bad” patents,7 complained the loudest about growth of patent-
assertion entities, and pushed the hardest for change.8 Missing from the 
debate, however, is a full account of the context of these seemingly 
disparate calls. This Article seeks to provide this context. It describes the 
history and present state of the patent arms race and patent marketplace, 
as well as the strategies companies are pursuing within the complex 
patent ecosystem to cope with its risks and to take advantage of its 
opportunities. 
Although both paradigms have flourished, the arms race and 
marketplace present a study in contrasts. In the patent arms race, patent 
arsenals signal a patentee’s power to retaliate; patent transactions in the 
marketplace, in contrast, are often kept secret. While patent détente 
requires symmetry between would-be litigants, the patent marketplace 
 
important uses of patents across all industries.”). For anecdotal accounts, see statements of Robert 
Barr and Russ Slifer, infra notes 16, 40 (giving public testimony about their companies’ participation in 
the patent arms race) and Patents: Smart Assets, Economist, Feb. 19, 2005, at 60, 60. 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. For example, Intellectual Ventures (“IV”), founded in 2000, has alone acquired tens of 
thousands of patents. Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar. 2010, 
at 41, 41; see also infra note 114. 
 4. This definition resembles Justice Kennedy’s description in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006), of “firms [that] use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.2.  
 5. See Colleen Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the 
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1577–79 (2009). 
 6. The term “patent ecosystem” was used, though not defined, by Brian Kahin in his testimony 
to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on December 5, 2008. Brian Kahin, The Patent Ecosystem in 
IT: Business Practice and Arbitrage (Dec. 5, 2008) (submission based on remarks before the FTC), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/bkahin2.pdf.  
 7. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
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facilitates the exploitation of asymmetries between actors. Companies 
who participate in the patent arms race desire freedom to operate; the 
marketplace has enabled companies to leverage their freedom to litigate. 
Closer inspection, however, reveals interrelationships between arms 
race and marketplace strategies. Patents initially acquired defensively 
have ended up for sale in the patent marketplace, through corporate 
divestitures and sales.9 Practicing companies have used their once-
defensive patents to selectively sue in areas in where they no longer or 
never did operate, using the same tactics as patent-assertion entities.10 
Patent-assertion entities that aggregate patents into large portfolios and 
sell licenses to them arguably reduce risk for companies in the same ways 
that defensive patents do. These dynamics have several implications for 
patent strategy, patent valuation, and patent reform. 
First, the new complex patent ecosystem has undermined the logic 
of the patent arms race. While patent arsenals have clearly failed to 
discourage lawsuits brought by patent holding entities, they have, at best, 
resulted in an uneasy truce among practicing companies. Though certain 
types of suits have likely been deterred, data presented in this Article 
shows that others have not. This incomplete protection has come at a 
social cost, contributing to the quality problem by creating a demand for 
patents that were never intended to be enforced, and contributing to the 
hold-up problem by creating stockpiles of unused patents that, when sold 
on the open market, are at risk of winding up in the hands of patent-
assertion entities. 
Second, patents are generally assumed to have an objective value, 
which can be estimated based on intrinsic qualities of a patent, such as 
the breadth of its claims, the amount of prior art it cites, and its 
prosecution history.11 The assumption that each patent has an intrinsic 
value underlies a host of policy proposals, including deferred 
examination and gold-plating patents. But today’s complex patent 
ecosystem reminds us that the value a patentee is likely to extract from a 
patent by asserting it against others—what I call the “exclusion value” of 
a patent—can fluctuate widely as the patent is bought and sold. There is 
a difference between a patent’s intrinsic value and its exclusion value. 
Little theoretical or empirical attention has been paid thus far to 
understanding the drivers of exclusion value, as distinct from intrinsic 
value. A better understanding of these drivers, however, could help 
companies predict and potentially avoid technical areas, where patent 
assertion is most likely, as well as help to distinguish between the portion 
 
 9. See discussion infra Parts I.B.2.a, IV.A. 
 10. See empirical analysis of same, reported infra at Part III.B. 
 11. Valuation literature making these assumptions is described infra notes 299 and 336. 
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of a patent royalty that is due to hold-up and that which is due to 
technical contribution. 
Finally, the history of the new complex ecosystem contains novel 
suggestions for patent reform. Scholars and policymakers tend to 
conceive of the patent system in terms of its three principal institutions—
Congress, the courts, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO)—and assume that the patent system can only be changed by 
adjusting a lever controlled by one of them.12 However, the history of the 
patent ecosystem highlights the influence of non-legal developments, 
including demonstration effects and business model innovations, on the 
patent system.13 This history suggests changing the patent system by 
changing patentee behavior directly, rather than through one of these 
three institutions. Improving patent quality and reducing patent hold-up 
might potentially be accomplished, for example, by promotion of quality 
patenting, abandonment or donation rather than sale of unused patents, 
and improved coordination by companies, rather than by just changing 
the law.14 
This Article explores the new complex patent ecosystem and its 
implications for the patent system. It proceeds in five parts. Part I 
describes the two major paradigms in high-tech patenting—the patent 
arms race and the marketplace—and how individual companies, 
demonstration effects, and licensing practices have driven their adoption. 
Part II provides an overview of the current patent ecosystem, of how it 
has become complex by virtue of the variety of the practicing and non-
practicing company types it features, and of the growing asymmetry 
between actors. Parts III–V discuss how the new patent ecosystem 
challenges conventional beliefs about the patent system and, more 
broadly, the implications of these challenges for patent reform. 
I.  From Arms Race to Marketplace 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many innovative high-tech 
companies did not file for patents.15 By the turn of the millennium, 
 
 12. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can 
Solve It (2009) (describing the industry-specific “macro” and “micro” policy levers that tailor the 
patent system to the needs of different industries). 
 13. See discussion infra Parts I.A.1–2, I.B.1. 
 14. This Article informs a larger body of work focused on the so-called “fourth pillar” of the 
patent system: patentees themselves. This Article treats patentee behavior not as the predetermined 
outcome of the patent system, but as an agent of change within the patent system, an independent 
force to be understood and harnessed. Colleen Chien, The Patent System’s Fourth Pillar (project in 
development); see also Colleen Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us 
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608111 (exploring the shape and impact of one 
form of patentee behavior—amicus briefs filings at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court). 
 15. See, e.g., Robert Greene Sterne et al., The 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape for Electronic 
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however, most had reversed stance and were filing for hundreds and 
even thousands of patents per year as part of the “patent arms race.”16 In 
the last decade, the patent “marketplace,” and the patent-assertion 
entities commonly associated with it, have grown in prominence. 
Through their lawsuits and licensing demands, patent-assertion entities 
have changed the high-tech patent environment.17 Part I provides a 
history of the patent arms race and patent marketplace, setting the stage 
for an exploration of the new complex patent ecosystem. 
A. Introduction to the Patent Arms Race 
The defensive use of patents dates back to at least the turn of the 
century, when, according to one account, Henry Ford accumulated 
automobile patents in order to reduce the risk of being sued and to 
obtain the ability to operate freely, without ever having to enforce the 
company’s patents.18 Filing for patents gave the Ford Motor Company 
 
Companies, in Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series: Annual Institute on Computer 
& Internet Law 3 (2005), available at http://64.237.99.107/media/pnc/7/media.507.pdf (“ The 1980s saw 
an amazing business phenomena in the U.S. of creation of many start up  electronic companies, some of 
which broke out of the pack of their competitors to become very large companies in their own right. 
Notable examples are Apple, Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, Sun, [and] AOL . . . . As upstarts, these 
companies in general did not embrace patents in the slightest.”); see also Kevin G. Rivette & David 
Kline, Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden Value of Patents 41–42 (2000) 
(describing ignorance and antipathy towards software patents as among the reasons companies did not 
file for them). 
 16. See, e.g., Rivette & Kline, supra note 15, at 4. (“[In 1990] Microsoft had one patent; [in 2000] 
it ha[d] close to 800. Sun, Oracle, Novell, Dell and Intel have likewise boosted the size of their patent 
portfolios by more than 500 percent just in the last few years.”); see also Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Joint Hearings Before the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 674 (Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Competition FTC Hearing II] (statement 
of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf (“Between 1984 and [19]93, the first [ten] years of the 
company, [Cisco] filed only one patent. . . . [In] 1994 the company had grown to over [$1 billion] in 
annual revenue. This growth was obviously not fuelled [sic] by patents, it was fuelled [sic] by 
competition and by open, nonproprietary interfaces. But in 1994, the company . . . [started] a program 
to obtain more patents. . . . We filed six patents in 1994. . . . We increased each year . . . [and] we’re 
now [in 2002] filing over [750] patents a year.”). 
 17. Daniel P. McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System, Sci. 
Progress, Fall & Winter 2008/2009, at 78, 78–79 (characterizing the emergence of “patent trolls” as 
representing the most significant and destabilizing change in the patent environment since 2003); see 
also Chris Coletta, Red Hat Among Companies in Crosshairs of License Suit, Triangle Bus. J., May 
16, 2008, http://triangle.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2008/05/19/story13.html (“Trolls are widely 
perceived . . . as the bane of the patent system.” (quoting Colleen Chien, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Santa Clara University) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18. Harold C. Wegner & Stephen B. Maebius, Patent Flooding: America’s New Patent Challenge 
11 (Spring 2002) (unpublished paper, George Washington Univ. Law School), available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/844/wegner_patentfloodingFTC.pdf 
(“Ford’s successors maintained a defensive posture and proudly never enforced their patents. The 
relatively large number of patents obtained by Ford was matched by General Motors and other 
competitors. They all created a defensive patent pool that was used to permit everyone to operate, 
essentially, free from the patent system.”). This paper was also presented as part of the testimony of 
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the ability to trade rights with its competitors, and to prevent the 
technology from being patented by others.19 
In the Parts that follow, I examine the history and practice of 
modern-day defensive patenting in high-tech industries in the context of 
three developments: the licensing campaigns of Texas Instruments (TI) 
and International Business Machines (IBM), the patent disputes between 
Kodak and Polaroid, and cross-licensing practices. 
1. The Catalysts 
While eventually practiced industry-wide, the modern-day practice 
of defensive patenting was catalyzed by the actions of single companies—
TI and IBM. In the mid-1980s, TI began an intensive licensing and 
litigation campaign to save the company from bankruptcy.20 A decade 
and a half and an estimated $4 billion later, it had achieved its corporate 
objective.21 Along the way, it fundamentally changed how hardware 
companies approached patenting. In the mid-1990s, IBM began its own 
campaign to monetize the considerable patent portfolio it had built up 
over the years.22 In the process of doing so, it “set off . . . a chain 
reaction”23 in the software industry and ushered in a new era of software 
patenting and licensing. The following paragraphs describe these 
transitions. 
TI’s domestic patent-licensing campaign was inspired by the 
company’s success in suing foreign competitors for patent infringement.24 
 
Stephen B. Maebius in joint hearings before the FTC and DOJ. The Supreme Court’s 1908 decision in 
Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908), establishing the lack of a 
working requirement, has also been credited with bolstering the ability of firms to patent defensively. 
David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th-
Century America 17 (1998). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Rivette & Kline, supra note 15, at 125 (“Texas Instruments . . . was reportedly saved from 
bankruptcy in the mid-1980s by an all-out patent licensing and litigation effort. In 1992 alone, TI 
earned $391 million from patent licenses—43 percent more than its $274 million in operating income 
for that year. Its current licensing revenues are thought to be about $800 million a year. All told, 
analysts estimate that TI has earned more than $4 billion in royalties since it began enforcing its 
patents in the mid-1980s.” (footnote omitted)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Julie L. Davis & Suzanne S. Harrison, Edison in the Boardroom: How Leading 
Companies Realize Value from Their Intellectual Assets 80–81 exh.3.6 (2001) (statement of Jerry 
Rosenthal, Vice President, IBM). 
 23. Emery Simon, Counselor, Policy Council of the Bus. Software Alliance, Remarks at the 
Brookings Institute Panel on Software and Law: Is Regulation Fostering or Inhibiting Innovation? 15 
(Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Brookings], transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/ 
events/20051207software.pdf; see also Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1917, 1921 (2007) (describing a “chain reaction theory” for why intellectual 
property rights, including through the patent “arms race,” have expanded). 
 24. Nicolas S. Gikkas, International Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Promise and the Peril, 
1 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 6, paras. 42–43 (1996) (describing TI’s 1986 International Trade Commission case 
against Asian Dynamic Random Access Memory manufacturers resulting in royalty payments of $1.5 
billion from 1986 through the first half of 1993); accord Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 
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Thus, at first, the company’s stance was adversarial, characterized by a 
willingness to pursue litigation.25 However, over time, the company 
moved towards a licensing model,26 signing non-exclusive licenses with 
major players in the industry.27 TI supported these efforts with an 
expanding patent portfolio—from 1986 to 1995, it filed 3537 patents, 
more than doubling the number of applications it had filed in the 
previous decade.28 
In the early 1990s, most software companies also had few patents.29 
IBM was an exception; as a hardware company, it had always applied for 
patents.30 As one of the first companies to file for software patents,31 IBM 
captured a quarter of the software patents issued between 1978 and 
1988.32 The company also pushed for development of the case law. Its 
appeal of a key USPTO decision led to a new form of claim, the 
Beauregard claim,33 and the development of guidelines in the mid-1990s 
for the examination of computer-related inventions.34 As part of a 
broader strategy within the company to patent aggressively, IBM 
reached its goal of top position in the patenting charts by 1993 and has 
 
653 (statement of Fred Telecky, Senior Vice President and General Patent Counsel, Texas 
Instruments, Inc.) (describing TI’s campaign of suing Japanese and Korean semiconductor companies 
in response to competitive threats and leading to the company’s patent licensing program). 
 25. Kristopher Boushie & Christopher Spadea, To Maximise IP Value a Company Needs the 
Right Culture, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Nov./Dec. 2003, at, 22, 22–23 (“Another very conscious shift was 
in TI’s willingness to pursue litigation.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Harold C. Wegner, Patent Reform “Quality” and “Pendency”: Drilling Down to “Backlog”, 
“Deferred Examination”, “Patent Worksharing” and Other Integers to Achieve Primary Goals, 2011 
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 18), available at http://www.grayonclaims.com/ 
storage/StanfordFeb26versJan18.pdf. 
 28.  TI Patents from 1986–1995, USPTO Patent Full-Text & Image Database, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (search string “AN/“texas instruments” AND 
ISD19760101->19851231” in the query form yields 1639 patents while “AN/“texas instruments” AND 
ISD19860101->19951231” yields 3537). 
 29. Brookings, supra note 23; see also Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related 
Inventions: Hearing Before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 17 (Jan. 26, 1994) (statement of 
Douglas K. Brotz, Principal Scientist, Adobe Systems Inc.) (“[W]hen we at Adobe founded a company 
[in 1982] on the concept of software to revolutionize the world of printing, we believed that there was 
no possibility of patenting our work. That belief did not stop us from creating that software, nor did it 
deter the savvy venture capitalists who helped us with the early investment. We have done very well 
despite our having no patents on our original work.”). 
 30. Davis & Harrison, supra note 22 (“We have been filing for patents for about 100 years, 
literally since the company was founded.”).  
 31. The era of software patenting was ushered in in large part by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981), that a rubber-curing process comprised patentable 
subject matter. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J. 1025, 1093 (1990). 
 32. Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and 
Materials 155 n.9 (3d ed. 2002). 
 33. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Victor Siber & Marilyn Smith 
Dawkins, Claiming Computer-Related Inventions as Articles of Manufacture, 35 IDEA 13–15 (1994). 
 34. Merges & Duffy, supra note 32, at 155 n.10. 
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remained there since.35 Around that time, the company decided to 
expand its patent licensing efforts, which had focused primarily on 
hardware,36 and to make IBM’s patent portfolio into a “profit center.”37 
In subsequent years, IBM launched an aggressive and successful licensing 
campaign that brought in over $1 billion in revenue annually by 2003.38 
By the late 1990s, many high-tech companies “had been stung by 
patent suits . . . and by cross license [sic] programs from IBM and other 
more established competitors that required significant royalty 
payments.”39 As companies grew tired of paying royalties for access to 
the patent portfolios of IBM and TI, they developed their own.40 The rate 
of semiconductor patenting per research and development (“R&D”) 
dollar doubled between 1985 and 1995.41 More dramatically, software 
patents, as a share of overall patents, increased more than seven-fold, 
from 2% in the early 1980s to 15% of patents by 2002.42 This growth 
appears to have resulted more from the importance of acquiring patents 
than to an increase in the amount of R&D spending.43 
2. Demonstration Effects 
Demonstration effects, that is, behavioral changes caused by 
observing others, also caused firms to adopt portfolio patenting 
strategies. A lawsuit initiated in 1976, and finally settled in 1990, by 
Polaroid against Kodak had a particularly profound impact.44 As 
semiconductor companies watched Kodak pay Polaroid nearly $1 billion 
 
 35. Marshall Phelps & David Kline, Burning the Ships: Intellectual Property and the 
Transformation of Microsoft 24–25 (2009) (describing IBM’s corporate strategy). 
 36. Davis & Harrison, supra note 22; see also Brookings, supra note 23. 
 37. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
 38. Id.; see also Chetan Sharma, What Is Your Patent Portfolio Quotient (PPQ)? 3 n.2 (2007), 
available at http://www.chetansharma.com/What%20is%20your%20Patent%20Portfolio%20Quotient.pdf. 
 39. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 3. 
 40. See, e.g., The Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets: Hearing Before the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n 82 (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Evolving Marketplace I] (statement of Russ Slifer, 
Chief Patent Counsel, Micron Technologies, Inc.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ 
ipmarketplace/mar18/090318transcript.pdf (“ [In the] late ‘70s, early ‘80s, we were somewhat late to the 
game, if you will . . . . There was already an awful lot of innovation from Texas Instruments, IBM and 
others in a large patent portfolio, so we found ourselves in a position where[,] to be able to participate 
in the industry, we had to pay license fees to those companies, and we did so.  As we were paying those 
fees and innovating our own technology, we sought our own patent portfolio as the technology 
advanced. We acquired a fairly substantial patent portfolio based on strong innovation, which allowed 
us to enter into cross-licensing agreements with other manufacturers.”). 
 41. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 660 (statement of Bronwyn Hall, Professor of 
Economics, University of California, Berkeley) (“[T]he semiconductor industry had a patenting rate 
per R&D dollar which doubled over about 10 years. In other words, the patenting rate had gone up 
enormously between 1985 and 1995.”). 
 42. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 1, at 47 tbl.1. 
 43. Id. at 23 (“Thus the majority of the growth in software patenting is not attributed to any of [a 
variety of factors including R&D intensity] and can be attributed, instead, to rapidly rising patent 
propensity.”). 
 44. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 109. 
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in damages, pay Polaroid’s customers and lawyers another $600 million, 
and shut down its instant camera business, including a manufacturing 
plant, at a cost of $1.5 billion and 700 employees,45 they became “really 
scared.”46 This case illustrated the substantial business risks, including the 
threat of injunction, associated with patent infringement.47 This particular 
lawsuit, as well as the patent-licensing campaigns of TI, had a profound 
impact on shaping firm strategies.48 
TI’s campaigns inspired not only fear, but awe within the IP 
community. The company, led by the “genius of Richard Donaldson,” 
demonstrated the considerable rewards that mining a corporate patent 
portfolio could yield.49 According to “folklore, . . . payments [from TI’s 
lawsuits] kept TI profitable for 5 straight quarters . . . [despite] significant 
sales los[s]es due to foreign competition.”50 This and related 
developments prompted companies to take a second look at their own 
patent portfolios.51 The books Rembrandts in the Attic and Edison in the 
Boardroom, which detailed the patent successes and failures of various 
companies,52 provided guides. 
3. Patent Portfolios for Cross-Licensing 
As companies grew their patent portfolios, many followed a variant 
of the “patenting anything” approach.53 In the words of its general 
counsel, for example, the software company Borland “filed patents on 
virtually everything.”54 Companies also used filing targets to try to build a 
 
 45. Rivette & Kline, supra note 15, at 93–96. 
 46. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 662 (statement of Bronwyn Hall, Professor of 
Economics, University of California, Berkeley) (“And the second demonstration effect . . . was the 
Kodak-Polaroid case. Even though that wasn’t in their industry, they saw the injunction and the 
shutdown of the business, of Kodak’s instant camera business, and that really scared them, because 
that was much more expensive than just having to pay past royalties.”). 
 47. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 109. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Wegner & Maebius, supra note 18, at 15–16. 
 50. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 4; accord Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 109 (“[Our industry 
participant] interviewees were well aware of the strategies that Texas Instruments had put in place to 
manage—and profit from—its patent portfolio . . . .”). 
 51. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 109. 
 52. See generally Davis & Harrison, supra note 22, (devoting chapter six to a case study of Dow 
Chemical Company); Rivette & Kline, supra note 20 (describing the patent strategies of, for example, 
IBM, Texas Instruments, and Xerox). 
 53. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 22–23 (describing a “patenting anything and everything” 
approach and explaining that the trigger for this rapid accumulation, in turn, was often the growth of a 
company to the point that it could be on the radar of an IBM or TI). 
 54. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Joint Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 351 (Feb. 27, 2002) [hereinafter 
Competition FTC Hearing I] (statement of Robert Kohn, Vice-Chairman of the Board and Director, 
Borland Software Corp.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227trans.pdf. 
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portfolio of a certain size55 and benchmarked their portfolios against 
others in order to determine how many patents to file.56 
In negotiations over complex technologies, parties focused on the 
quantity rather than the quality of patents in a portfolio. According to 
the infamous “ruler” methodology, “you would bring your stack and 
you’d bring a ruler, and you’d put each stack next to each other and 
you’d take a ruler and you measure the relative heights of the stack. And 
some algorithm would tell you the number.”57 Or, companies might 
examine a few patents representative of each portfolio during a cross-
licensing negotiation, but very rarely during a cross-licensing negotiation 
was each patent scrutinized individually. As general counsel of TI 
famously put it, “for [TI] to know what’s in [its patent] portfolio, we 
think, is just a mind-boggling, budget-busting exercise to try to 
figure . . . out with any degree of accuracy at all.”58 The high cost of 
evaluating which patents in a portfolio of thousands might apply to each 
product, the likelihood of the patents’ validity, the appropriate royalty 
rate, and the appropriate base from which to calculate the royalty has led 
patent licenses to be “negotiated en masse.”59 Portfolio cross-licensing, 
based on quantity and other proxies of coverage, has simply proven to be 
more efficient than the alternative. 
This licensing dynamic has spurred the growth of defensive 
patenting, the filing of patents in order to gain freedom to operate,60 for 
the specific purposes of maintaining patent peace, obtaining access to the 
technology of others, and neutralizing patent lawsuits.61 As the general 
 
 55. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Joint Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 33 (Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter 
Competition FTC Hearing III] (statement of Richard Thurston, Vice President and General Counsel, 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020320trans.pdf 
(“Our goal now is to file about 500 patents a year . . . largely for defensive purposes.”). 
 56. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 22 (describing a benchmarking approach based on patents 
issued and revenue). 
 57.  The Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets: The IP Marketplace in the IT 
Industry: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n 132 (May 4, 2009) [hereinafter Evolving Marketplace 
III] (statement of Ron Epstein, Chief Executive Officer, Ipotential, LLC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/may4/090504transcript.pdf. 
 58. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 743 (statement of Fred Telecky, Senior Vice 
President and General Patent Counsel, Texas Instruments Corp.). 
 59. Kahin, supra note 6, at 9; see, e.g., Tex. Instruments v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., 49 F. Supp. 2d 
893, 901 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (“[I]t is almost impossible on a patent-by-patent, country-by-country, 
product-by-product basis to determine whether someone is using a company’s patents.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law and Policy 33 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
innovationrpt.pdf (“Defensive patenting is primarily motivated by a desire to ensure freedom to 
operate and includes the use of patents as bargaining chips in cross-licensing negotiations.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 61. Id. at 52 (“[F]irms pursue defensive patenting: (1) to maintain detente with rivals; (2) to 
obtain portfolio cross-licenses from rivals; and (3) to raise a patent infringement counter-claim should 
a rival sue . . . .”). Defensive patenting is practiced in other countries as well. See, e.g., Dietmar 
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counsel of semiconductor foundry Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Company commented, “[s]ometimes the ability to throw 20, 50 good 
patents against someone . . . does enable the scales to be a little bit better 
balanced, especially as you’re playing a catch-up game . . . .”62 
Large portfolios have spawned the development of other large 
portfolios. Parchomovsky and Wagner describe this as a “feedback 
effect, whereby low-quality patents (organized into ever-larger 
portfolios) beget even more low-quality patents.”63 To improve their 
bargaining position in cross-licensing, companies engage in “portfolio 
maximization,” the practice of growing their patent portfolios in number 
and breadth.64 In pursuit of the patent arms race, companies have 
devoted considerable financial and technical resources to patenting,65 in 
some cases, even acting in opposition to their own corporate 
philosophies66 and, arguably, their self-interest.67 
 
Harhoff, et al., INNO-tec, The Strategic Use of Patents and Its Implications for Enterprise and 
Competition Policies 253 (2007), available at www.en.inno-tec.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/research/proj/ 
laufendeprojekte/patents/stratpat2007.pdf (describing portfolio maximization strategies in Europe); 
Sachiko Hirao, Japanese Firms Urged to Better Protect Patents, Japan Times Online, Nov. 8, 2001, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20011108b1.html (reporting on a 1999 survey by the Japan 
Intellectual Property Association in which approximately 80% of member companies claimed that the 
purpose of their patents was defensive). 
 62. Competition FTC Hearing III, supra note 55, at 33 (statement of Richard Thurston, Vice 
President and General Counsel of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.). 
 63. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2135, 2155 
(2009); see also generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1 (2005). 
 64. Harhoff et al., supra note 61, at 9–10. Of course, large portfolios can be used for not just 
defensive, but also potentially anticompetitive purposes, including patent “flooding,” in which a 
dominant firm files for a large number of patents in order to deter entry into the market by rivals or by 
forcing cross-licensing of core technology. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Competition Policy 
Roundtables: Competition, Patents and Innovation (II) 16–17 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/26/33/45019987.pdf. 
 65.  See, e.g., Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions: 
Hearing Before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 48–50 (Jan. 26, 1994) (statement of Jim Warren, 
Director, Autodesk, Inc.), transcript available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/ 
software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf; see also Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 677–78 (statement 
of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.); 
Competition FTC Hearing I, supra note 54, at 376 (statement of Jordan Greenhall, Chief Executive 
Officer, Divx Networks) (“I have now issued a directive that we reallocate roughly 20 to 35 percent of 
our developer’s resources and sign on two separate law firms to increase our patent portfolio to be 
able to engage in the patent spew conflict.”). 
 66. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 713 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President 
for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (“[W]e’ve entered this game five, six years 
ago in full force for the wrong reason and we’re contributing to the proliferation to mutually assured 
destruction.”). 
 67. As Polk Wagner argues, “even if most firms would be better off with high-quality patents 
(and fewer of them), adopting such a strategy in the face of others’ more numerous (and lower quality) 
patents is disadvantageous. Thus firms maintain the suboptimal strategy.” Wagner, supra note 63. 
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The hope, of course, is that patent stockpiles will bring about a 
“patent peace,” in which companies agree to license to,68 or perhaps to 
ignore, each other entirely.69 This would give portfolio-holders the 
freedom to operate without having to worry about being sued, despite 
likely widespread infringement throughout the industry. 
B. The Patent Marketplace 
Over the last several years, another paradigm has risen to 
prominence within the patent system. The growth of the patent 
marketplace, in which patents can be bought, sold, and traded, has 
created new opportunities and obstacles for patentees. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) convened a series of public hearings from 2008 
to 2009 to explore this development and its impact on innovation and 
competition.70 Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have cited the growth 
of an industry “in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees” as a 
reason to change patent law.71 Suits brought by patent-assertion entities 
have spurred calls for congressional patent reform to curtail the ability of 
patent plaintiffs to sue in inconvenient venues and to limit the recovery 
of damages.72 These events herald the recent, historic evolution of the 
patent market. 
1. History 
Patents have long been bought and sold.73 In her study of the early 
American patent system, Zorina Kahn finds that patents were assigned 
 
 68. Brookings, supra note 23 (“The practice generally in the technology industry with respect to 
patents is not so much to license for cash, ‘You can use my invention for $12.95.’ It’s much more of a 
cross-licensing pattern, ‘So I have a few patents, you have a few patents, and we’ll license each 
other.’”). 
 69. Survey: The Arms Race, Economist, Oct. 22, 2005, at 10, 10 (“The best that can happen is 
nothing happens.” (quoting Joe LaSala, General Counsel of Novell)). 
 70. FTC Workshop: The Evolving IP Marketplace, Fed. Trade Comm’n, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
workshops/ipmarketplace/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 71. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In 
cases now arising, trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent 
being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike 
earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.” (citation omitted)). 
 72. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1260 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 94–95 (2009) (statement of Mark Chandler, General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Cisco 
Systems, Inc.), http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/Chandler%20Testimony%20Cisco%20043009.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2010) (“[Current] protections . . . are not effective against NPEs. Far from deterring 
the filing of such claims, the current rules [] encourage patent-holding entities to pursue [] 
opportunistic lawsuits.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 73. B. Zorina Kahn, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in 
American Economic Development, 1790–1920, at 155 & n.50 (2005) (describing how, in 1878, Maria 
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during this period in order to “market and commercialize the invention,” 
among other reasons.74 In modern times, companies have bought IP in 
order to support their product strategies75 and to seed new product 
development opportunities.76 
In recent years, the proliferation of companies focused on the 
assertion, rather than the commercialization, of patents they acquire has 
created a new class of patent buyers.77 This same period has witnessed a 
growth in the strategic management of patents. These developments 
have fueled growth in the patent marketplace, accompanied by an 
increase in liquidity, transactions, and business models for buyers, sellers, 
and intermediaries.78 
The growth of the patent marketplace, just like the patent arms 
race, has been spurred by examples set by key actors in the patent 
system. One of them was the prolific independent inventor Jerome 
Lemelson, who was granted over 600 patents covering a wide variety of 
technologies.79 In the 1980s and 1990s, Lemelson signed licenses with 
approximately a thousand companies,80 earning him billions of dollars81 
and the title of “patent troll.”82 These campaigns provided a model for 
 
Beasley sold rights over her patented footwarmer to Osborn Conrad of Philadelphia, a few months 
after the patent issued, and how she also agreed to transfer half of the rights in an unfinished invention 
to James Henry of Philadelphia in exchange for funds to finish it). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Rivette & Kline, supra note 15, at 71 (describing IP-enabled “grow” strategies in which the 
purchase or development of intellectual property is used to support new product lines or expansion 
into new markets). 
 76. The Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n 39–40 (Apr. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Evolving Marketplace II] (statement of Jim Malackowski, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Ocean Tomo, LLC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
workshops/ipmarketplace/apr17/transcript.pdf (describing early markets, such as Yet2.com, as being 
focused on selling new product development opportunities). 
 77. Chien, supra note 5. 
 78. Lew Zaretzki, Rising Prices and Changing Strategies, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Feb./Mar. 2008, at 
61, 61. 
 79. Jerome Lemelson’s Patents, Smithsonian Lemelson Ctr., http://invention.smithsonian.org/ 
about/about_patents.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2010); see also A Special Tribute to: Jerome Lemelson, 
Am.’s Inventor Online, http://www.inventionconvention.com/americasinventor/dec97issue/ 
section16.html#Friday (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 80. Mary Waldron, The Patent Prosecution Pioneer: Intellectual Property Attorney Gerald Hosier, 
LawCrossing, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/pdf/3445.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (“To date, 
Hosier has retrieved about $1.5 billion from more than 950 companies for Jerome Lemelson and his 
estate.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Bernard H. Chao, After eBay Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent 
Remedies, 9 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 543, 558 n.74 (2008); see also Adam Goldman, Some Claim 
Inventor Lemelson a Fraud, USAToday, Aug. 21, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/ 
discoveries/2005-08-21-lemelson-fraud_x.htm. Although Jerome Lemelson’s patent enforcement 
campaigns predated those of others, he was not the first opportunistic licensor. See Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1809, 1811 (2007) (describing nineteenth century “patent sharks,” who bought dormant patents 
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suing practicing companies that has since been followed by many 
independent inventors.83 They also popularized the contingent-fee 
arrangement Lemelson had with his attorney, Gerald Hosier. The 
hundreds of millions of dollars in fees earned by Hosier have led others 
to describe him as an “awe-inspiring” pioneer in the legal field, due to his 
innovative legal approach,84 and to follow in his footsteps.85 
The patent holding company Intellectual Ventures (“IV”), led by 
Nathan Myhrvold, has also played a seminal role in the development of 
the patent marketplace. In order to carry out its stated objective of 
building a capital market for inventions,86 IV has acquired at least 30,000 
patents from a diverse set of IP owners.87 According to one account, “it is 
rare to meet an IP owner who has not received an inquiry from IV. Even 
when an owner does not sell to IV, the experience educates them and as 
a result they sometimes enter the market later.”88 As such, IV has had a 
tremendous influence in developing the market, not only through its 
transactions, but also by raising awareness of the opportunities offered 
by the patent marketplace. 
While transactions in the secondary market are hard to track 
systematically, the patents offered in public auctions have generally 
covered high-tech inventions.89 This is likely due to their historical source 
(defunct startups), the density of patents covering high-tech products, 
and the ease with which patents in high-tech areas can be filed without 
actually making the invention.90 
 
and used them to sue farmers). 
 83. Wegner & Maebius, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the mold-breaking Jerome Lemelson 
paradigm of an inventor outside the industry suing within the industry). 
 84. Waldron, supra note 80. 
 85. Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, Recorder (July 30, 
2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf (“[Gerald Hosier is] the best-known lawyer in the 
patent-enforcement industry.”). 
 86. Myhrvold, supra note 3. 
 87. Id. This number does not include patent applications, which are likely to be numerous. See, 
e.g., Avancept, A Study of: The Intellectual Ventures Portfolio in the United States: Patents & 
Applications 6 (2d ed. 2010) (on file with the author) (estimating IV’s portfolio, at the end of 2009, to 
include at least 25,000 to 50,000 patents/applications and possibly even more patent assets). 
 88. Zaretzki, supra note 78, at 62; see also Carlyn Kolker, Billion-Dollar Lawyer Desmarais Quits 
Firm to Troll for Patents, Bus. Wk. (June 1, 2010, 12:04 AM EDT), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-06-01/billion-dollar-lawyer-desmarais-quits-firm-to-troll-for-patents.html; Jeff Kuester & 
Brett Bartel, Evolution of the IP Market, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 30, 32 (“IV . . . has 
‘represented half of the purchasing market for US patents over the last few years’ [as of 2009].” 
(quoting Steven Hoffman, Chief Executive Officer, ThinkFire)). 
 89. See, e.g., analysis reported infra note 110 (describing the top sellers in Ocean Tomo auctions 
as being Sun, AT&T, and IBM). 
 90. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 5, at 1580 (describing the reasons non-practicing entities have 
focused on high-tech inventions). 
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2. Actors in the Patent Marketplace 
The patent marketplace includes patent buyers, patent sellers, and 
the intermediaries that facilitate transactions between them. In the 
following subparts, I describe members of the patent ecosystem in terms 
of their relationship to the patent marketplace. The general roles and 
strategies of various practicing and non-practicing companies are 
described later, in Part II. 
a. Sellers 
While the total volume of patent sales has not been studied 
systematically, a number of patent “pathways” are familiar. A university 
exclusively licenses or assigns its patents to a university spinoff.91 A 
company files for bankruptcy and sells its patents in the resulting fire 
sale.92 A large company sells a dying business line and the patent assets 
along with it, or simply donates or sells patents it is no longer using.93 
Patents often have longer shelf-lives than the products, strategies, and 
even companies they are initially obtained to support. In the patent 
system, patents are owned by corporations, universities, nonprofits, small 
businesses, individuals, and the government.94 All of these types of 
entities have sold their patents in the marketplace through public 
auction95 and private transaction.96 
The patent marketplace has developed an association with patent-
assertion entities, or “trolls.” For this reason, selling into patent markets 
has for some time been considered an “anathema or unforgivable sin for 
large corporations.”97 Recently, however, attitudes have changed. 
Corporations have large numbers of assets that are unlikely ever to be 
 
 91. See, e.g., Richard Brandt, Net Assets: How Stanford’s Computer Science Department Changed 
the Way We Get Information, Stanford Mag., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 46, 50 (describing the Stanford 
patent that Google was founded to develop and commercialize). 
 92. For example, Commerce One sold its web services patent portfolio during bankruptcy 
proceedings, in 2004, to Novell. Robert Cover, Commerce One Auctions Web Services Patents, Cover 
Pages (Nov. 17, 2004), http://xml.coverpages.org/CommerceOnePatents.html. The patents may also be 
auctioned on eBay. See, e.g., Adam Jones, Looking to Sell Your Patent Portfolio? Put It on eBay, IP 
Law Blog (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/-patent-law-looking-to-sell-your-
patent-portfolio-put-it-on-ebay.html (describing patents for sale on eBay). 
 93. David Hetzel & Kirk Dailey, Shooting the Patent Divestiture Rapids, Intell. Asset Mgmt., 
Feb./Mar. 2008, at 13, 13–18 (describing various reasons companies divest their patent assets). 
 94. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099, 2116–17 (2000) (describing this diversity of 
patent owners). 
 95. Ocean Tomo, Ocean Tomo 2007/2008 Auction Guides (2008) (on file with the author) 
(describing offerings from entities including NASA, The University of California, AT&T, 3Com, 
Boeing, Free Publication Systems, Inc., and a number of individual inventors). 
 96. Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 48–49 (describing IV as acquiring patents from these sources). 
 97. Evolving Marketplace III, supra note 57, at 95. 
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used and are expensive to maintain.98 To dispose of these assets, many 
companies are turning to the patent marketplace.99 
IV has stated that a “good number of the patents we buy come from 
large, healthy companies,” including over 100 Fortune 500 companies.100 
Acacia has been engaged by “large companies looking to turn their 
patents into revenue.”101 In an analysis of all the patent lots offered for 
sale during Ocean Tomo auctions from Fall 2006 to Spring 2009, nearly 
half originated from practicing companies,102 and almost a quarter of 
them (125 out of 511) were offered by public companies.103 Among public 
companies, Sun listed the most lots, at thirteen, followed by IBM at ten 
and AT&T at eight; household names Dow Chemical, 3Com, and 
Motorola also listed patents.104 The marketplace has provided a path to 
liquidity not only for startups and individuals, but for corporations 
including Philips Electronics, Siemens AG, Ford Motors, and Kimberly-
Clark.105 
b. Buyers 
Patent buyers are motivated by a diverse set of concerns. The two 
largest buyers of patents in the patent marketplace in the recent past—
IV106 and John Desmarais107—do not practice their patents. In the recent 
past, approximately 90% of the patents sold in public auction have been 
 
 98. The reasons for and implications of which are discussed infra Parts II–IV. 
 99. Evolving Marketplace II, supra note 76, at 42–43 (statement of Steven J. Hoffman, Chief 
Executive Officer of ThinkFire) (“[T]he number of large corporations that have started to consider 
selling their portfolios or at least part of their portfolios has dramatically increased over the last couple 
of years.”); id. at 44 (statement of Marcus Delgado, Chief IP Counsel, Cox Communications, Inc.) 
(“[J]ust looking at Ocean Tomo’s markets, I have followed the lot since they began offering those 
patents at auction, and you can see the progression from smaller independent inventors to very 
sophisticated companies now that provide their patents to that auction pool . . . .”). 
 100. Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 49. 
 101. Acacia Techs., LLC, Acacia Technologies: Leader in Patent Licensing and Enforcement 
3, http://acaciatechnologies.com/docs/CorporateBrochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).  
 102. Tom Ewing, Inside the World of Public Auctions, Intell. Asset Mgmt., July/Aug. 2010, at 63, 
63. 
 103. Based on catalogs from the Fall 2006, Spring 2007, Fall 2007, Spring 2008, Fall 2008, and 
Spring 2009 auctions obtained from www.oceantomo.com. Independent analysis is on file with the 
Author and copies of the catalogues are on file with the Hastings Law Journal. 
 104. Ocean Tomo, Ocean Tomo Fall 2008 Live IP Auction Catalogue 64 (2008) (3Com); Ocean 
Tomo, Spring 2006 Live Patent Auction 137 (2006) (Motorola). 
 105. Ocean Tomo, Ocean Tomo Fall 2008 Live IP Auction Catalogue 266 (2008) (Phillips); 
Ocean Tomo, Ocean Tomo Auctions: Fall 2007 Catalogue 223 (2007) (Kimberly-Clark); Ocean 
Tomo, Spring 2006 Live Patent Auction 139 (2006) (Ford Motors). See generally Ocean Tomo, 
Ocean Tomo Fall 2006 Intellectual Property Auction 3 (2006). 
 106. Zaretzki, supra note 78, at 63; see also Ewing, supra note 102, at 63–64 & fig.1 (describing IV 
as buying 75.8% of publicly auctioned patent lots); Kolker, supra note 88; Kuester & Bartel, supra 
note 88, at 32 (“IV . . . has ‘represented half of the purchasing market for US patents over the last few 
years’ [as of 2009].” (quoting Steven Hoffman, Chief Executive Officer, ThinkFire)). 
 107. Kolker, supra note 88.  
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purchased by non-practicing entities—an estimated 75% by IV and the 
remainder by other non-practicing entities.108 
Practicing companies also purchase patents in the patent 
marketplace; however, they appear to be more interested in selling 
patents than in buying them, because while they have supplied half of the 
lots available in public auction, they have purchased only about 11% of 
the lots sold.109 This number likely underrepresents the share of total 
patents sold to practicing companies on the public and private market, as 
practicing companies may prefer to buy in the private market, where 
they have better control over the amount of information available to 
competitors and to the public.110 
Still, practicing companies historically have developed their own IP, 
rather than acquire it from others, and most view IP management as 
ancillary to their core business of making and selling products and 
services. In addition, patents are unique assets; “[t]he typical operating 
company will be looking for patents satisfying some very specific 
characteristics, and the odds that such a patent will be waiting for them 
are slim.”111 This may explain why, according to patent brokerage firm 
ThinkFire, most firms are “inactive” with respect to the patent market.112 
While some companies intermittently pursue transactions on an ad hoc 
basis and a few have “evolving” patent transaction capabilities, the 
fewest number perform significant transactions on a regular basis.113 Still, 
if the right patents are available, it may be faster and administratively 
easier to acquire them on the market, rather than to file applications and 
wait for them to mature into patents. Patents for sale may have an early 
priority date and can be used to fill gaps in a company’s patent portfolio. 
c. Intermediaries 
Many intermediaries have developed to help buyers and sellers find 
each other.114 Ocean Tomo conducted public IP auctions between 2006 
 
 108. See sources cited supra note 106. 
 109. Ewing, supra note 102, at 64. 
 110. The assets available in public auction are perceived to be of higher quality than assets 
otherwise available on the market. Id. at 66 (calling patent auction assets “generally higher” quality 
than patent assets from other sources). 
 111. Id. at 66. 
 112. ThinkFire, Presentation at the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology Conference: Patent 
Valuation Conference 16 (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/zaretzki.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
 114. For a comprehensive and in-depth summary, see Raymond Millien & Ron Laurie, Meet the 
Middlemen, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Feb./Mar. 2008, at 53, 55; see also Peter Detkin, Founder & Vice 
Chairman, Intellectual Ventures, Presentation at the Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings: The 
Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets 11 (Dec. 5, 2008), presentation available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/pdetkin.pdf; Raymond Millien, Chief 
Executive Officer, PCT Capital, LLC, Presentation at the Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings: The 
Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets 8–9 (Dec. 5, 2008), presentation available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/rmillien.pdf (describing seventeen different 
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and 2009115 but sold its auction unit to British brokerage ICAP in 2009.116 
In the past, PL-X117 and TAEUS have also offered online web auction 
capabilities.118 While public auctions comprise the most visible type of 
trading platform, the vast majority of transactions are conducted in 
private—either by direct sale, brokered private sale, or private auction.119 
Agent/brokers like iPotential and ThinkFire help patent sellers find 
patent buyers or licensees by directly marketing to potential buyers or 
licensees.120 Patent-assertion managers like General Patent Corporation 
International provide technical and financial support services to patent-
assertion entities and help them evaluate the viability of their patent 
cases.121 Behind the scenes, investment companies like Rembrandt IP and 
Altitude Capital provide the funds to acquire, license, and litigate 
patents.122 Portfolio company Acacia counts among its largest investors 
household mutual fund managers like OppenheimerFunds, Fidelity, and 
the Vanguard Group,123 and IV’s funders include many practicing 
companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Apple, eBay, and Google.124 In 
addition to contingent fee law firms like Niro Scavone, Fish & 
Richardson and Cooley Godward Kronish have been singled out for 
working with patent-assertion entities.125 
 
types of IP business models). 
 115. Ewing, supra note 102. 
 116. Daisy Ku, UPDATE 1-UK’s ICAP Buys Patent Broker Tomo for $10 Mln, Reuters (June 16, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLG50594520090616. 
 117. See Jamie Ludowitz, PLX Announces Plans to Revolutionize $3.5 Billion Patent Industry 
Through Global, Internet-Based Patent Auction Market, EurekAlert! (Jan. 22, 1999), 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/1999-01/FI-PAPT-220199.php#; see also Hans Ibold, Intellectual 
Property Auction Site Draws Heavy Action, L.A. Bus. J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 16, 16. 
 118. See Glenn Wheeler, What’s Your Strategy at the IP Auction, Taeus Int’l Corp., 
http://www.taeus.com/article.php?id=72 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 119. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 102, at 67 (approximating IV’s acquisition expenditures through 
public auction to be 5% of its total acquisition expenditures). 
 120. Millien & Laurie, supra note 114, at 55. 
 121. Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 Intell. 
Prop. L. Bull. 1, 10 (2008). 
 122. See Mike Masnick, Patent Holder Sues McAfee, Gets $25 Million… But May End Up 
Losing $5 Million Due to Everyone It Has To Pay Off, Techdirt (Nov. 4, 2009, 12:51 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/blog.php?company=altitude+capital+partners&edition=; Nathan Vardi, 
Patent Payday, Forbes.com (Feb. 12, 2008, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/11/ 
patents-legal-rembrandt-biz-cz_nv_0212patent.html. 
 123. Shareholders Major ACTG Acacia Research Corporation Shareholders, MorningStar, 
http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholdersmajor.html?t=ACTG&region=USA&culture
=en-US+%28%29 (click tab for “Institutions” to see Oppenheimer Funds) (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 124. Nicholas Varchaver, Who’s Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, Fortune, July 10, 2006, at 110, 112. 
 125. Fawcett & Chan, supra note 121, at 9; see also Zusha Elinson, Intellectual Venture Takes 
Indirect Route to Court, Recorder (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/ 
LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202433490140 (“The widely used insult ‘patent troll’ was coined to 
describe Niro and his clients by Peter Detkin, then an Intel Corp. lawyer. Detkin is now co-founder 
and vice chairman of Intellectual Ventures.”). 
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These and other intermediaries are needed to navigate what has 
been characterized as a thin or “blind” market in which buyers and 
sellers often miss each other.126 In the recent past, the market has been 
heavily dependent on the behavior of a single market-maker, IV. As 
between buyers and sellers in general, there appears to be greater supply 
than demand for patents,127 which insiders predict may cause a “flight to 
quality.”128 At this point, it is unclear whether the vision of a robust, 
liquid “invention capital market” promoted by some129 will actually be 
realized. 
C. Differences Between “Arms Race” and “Marketplace” 
Paradigms 
Although the arms race and marketplace paradigms coexist in 
today’s complex patent ecosystem, they differ significantly in some ways. 
While the arms race requires symmetry between competitors in order to 
keep litigation at bay, the marketplace facilitates the exploitation of 
asymmetries between actors. Defensive patents are the product of 
portfolio patenting, while “marketplace” portfolios are the product of 
patent purchasing. In the patent arms race, a defensive patent portfolio 
sends a signal to the public: Do not sue, or you might be sued. The 
marketplace, in contrast, allows companies to operate in secrecy. 
Companies participate in the patent arms race in order to gain freedom 
to operate, while the patent marketplace supports companies who 
leverage their freedom to litigate. Each of these contrasts is explored in 
greater detail below. 
1. Symmetric v. Asymmetric Stakes 
In the patent arms race, the symmetry of exposure and stakes 
between market actors is crucial to maintaining a patent stalemate. A 
pile of patents on each side means that each company has a potential 
weapon against the other; likewise, the product revenues on both sides 
mean that each is vulnerable to suit by the other. In the marketplace, the 
inverse is true—the wide diversity of business models means that 
 
 126. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 257, 
257–58 (2007). 
 127. One example of this imbalance was Ocean Tomo’s failed spring 2009 auction, in which only 
six out of eighty patent lots sold. Joe Mullin, Bummer Before the Summer: OceanTomo Auction a Bust, 
The Prior Art (Mar. 30, 2009, 6:22 AM), http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2009/03/ 
ocean-tomo-2009-spring-auction-results.html. 
 128. Zaretzki, supra note 78, at 66. 
 129. See generally Myhrvold, supra note 3 (describing his vision of an invention capital market that 
would provide funding and strong patents for inventors, among other roles); Joe Mullin, Patent 
Enforcement Companies Speak at SF Conference, The Prior Art (May 28, 2010, 12:16 PM), 
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2010/05/patent-enforcement-companies-speak-at-sf-
conference.html (describing Erich Spangenberg’s projection that the patent market will become more 
liquid and transactional).  
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companies can exploit asymmetries to their advantage. Companies that 
do not make products target the revenues of those that do. Such 
patentees are not burdened by the need to manage investor expectations 
or minimize disruption to the company’s core business.130 Some practicing 
companies have also taken advantage of asymmetric exposure between 
themselves and their targets by suing companies that work in areas that 
they do not, making them invulnerable to countersuit. This phenomenon 
is documented and explored in greater depth in Part II.A. 
2. Portfolio Patenting v. Patent Purchasing 
“Arms race” and “marketplace” approaches to patenting also differ. 
In pursuit of the patent arms race, companies generally file for patents 
on a wide range of inventions. In contrast, portfolios built on purchases 
from the marketplace tend to be smaller and more focused. With the 
exception of large portfolio companies like IV and Acacia, many of the 
patent-assertion entities associated with the patent marketplace have 
relatively small patent portfolios.131 For example, the website of Paice, 
LLC, a Bonita Springs, Florida-based company that has sued Toyota and 
Ford over hybrid technology,132 boasts just eleven U.S. patents.133 
Similarly, just five patents were asserted by NTP, Inc., a patent-assertion 
entity, in a suit against Research In Motion Limited (“RIM”) that led to 
a $612 million settlement.134 For a patent-assertion entity, the limiting 
factor is often not the number of patents but the organizational resources 
required to assert the patents. 
A practicing company’s defensive patent portfolio, in contrast, 
needs to be larger in order to cover the wide range of technologies that 
may be relevant in the future. A typical cross-licensing deal between two 
large companies might involve rights to all patents in the companies’ 
portfolios, numbering in the thousands.135 
While small in size, the portfolios of companies like Paice tend to 
have a higher proportion of “crown jewels.” For example, of the eleven 
patents listed as being in the Paice portfolio, four have been recognized 
as among the top nine “most dominant” patents in the hybrid technology 
field, based on an analysis of patent trends and citations performed by an 
independent source.136 Likewise, in a larger study of 565 “troll” patents, 
 
 130. Chien, supra note 5, at 1579. 
 131. See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 17, at 80 (“[P]atent enforcement entities . . . are highly selective 
in their purchases. They have relatively small and focused patent portfolios.”). 
 132. Paice’s Patents: Paice and Toyota, Paice, http://www.paice.net/paices-patents/paice-v-toyota 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 133. Paice’s Patents: List of U.S. Patents, Paice, http://www.paice.net/paices-patents/list-of-u-s-patents 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 134. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 135. Richard Raysman et al., Intellectual Property Licensing: Forms and Analysis § 6.02A 
(2010). 
 136. Mike Lloyd & Justin Blows, Who Holds the Power? Lessons from Hybrid Car 
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Fisher and Henkel found the “troll” patents to be significantly higher 
quality than others,137 contrary to reports that patent-assertion entity 
patents are generally weak and of low quality.138 
3. Patent Signals v. Patent Secrecy 
In the arms race, patents are used to send signals to the public. The 
primary message that a large patent portfolio sends to competitors is: If 
sued, I have the ability to retaliate. Patenting activity also conveys to the 
world that the patentee is innovative and a technology leader.139 IBM, for 
example, communicates both of these messages year after year, by 
publicizing its status as a top patentee.140 
In contrast, the marketplace allows companies to exploit secrecy to 
their advantage. Many patent-assertion entities, for example, lack 
websites that describe what they do.141 IV, Acacia, and others have 
assigned their patents to thousands of shell companies and subsidiaries, 
making it hard to track what they do.142 This secrecy serves a “troll” 
business model, in which patentees wait until companies are already 
practicing an invention to “surprise” them with a suit.143 For these 
reasons, patent-assertion entities are more likely to “speak softly and 
wield a big stick,” as it were, than to publicize their holdings. Practicing 
companies also have been known to hide information about patent 
transactions, for example, in order to avoid public scrutiny.144 
A lack of transparency in the marketplace serves sellers as well as 
buyers. The anonymity of the marketplace allows companies to transact 
 
Innovation for Clean Technologies 10 tbl.2 (2009). 
 137. Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology—An Empirical 
Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions 18 (Dec. 2009) (working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102. 
 138. Mallun Yen, Panel on Developing Business Models: View from the Industry 3 (Dec 5, 2008) 
(prepared statement submitted to the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ 
ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/myen2.pdf (“[M]ore often, the assertions we receive present patents of 
dubious validity and weak arguments of infringement . . . .”). 
 139. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 651–53 (2002). 
 140. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Robert Jaques, IBM Sets Record for 
Most Patents Lodged in a Year, Australian PC Auth. (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.pcauthority.com.au/ 
News/71117,ibm-sets-record-for-most-patents-lodged-in-a-year.aspx. 
 141. Described generally in Chien, supra note 5. 
 142. See, e.g., Press Release, Acacia Research Corp., Acacia Research Reports First Quarter 2009 
Financial Results (Apr. 23, 2009), http://acaciatechnologies.com/pr/0423091stqtrfinancials.pdf 
(describing Acacia’s more than 100 patent portfolios, held collectively by its many subsidiaries); 
Avancept, supra note 87, at 18 (estimating that IV has up to 1100 shell companies); see also Mullin, 
supra note 129 (“[Erich Spangenberg has a] very large network of patent-holding companies, several 
of which are named after Greek gods.”). 
 143. See Chien, supra note 5, at 1579 n.34. 
 144. Ewing, supra note 102, at 69 (“CFOs nervously roll IP licensing expenses into the costs of 
goods produced to avoid any public slip. Miniature versions of actual sales documents are publicly 
recorded to thwart greater disclosure. Creating a limited liability company to hold IP assets provides 
still greater uncertainty.”). 
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with partners with whom they may not want to be publicly associated. 
However, the opacity of the market creates information asymmetries and 
opportunities for arbitrage. Intermediaries such as the Patent Troll 
Tracker, which sought to expose patent trolls as they sued,145 Avancept, 
which uses a variety of methods to research and develop reports about 
IV,146 and PatentFreedom, which amasses and distributes information 
about patent-assertion entities to its customers,147 have arisen to provide 
data about the market not otherwise readily available. 
4. Freedom to Operate v. Freedom to Litigate 
While defensive patent portfolios are acquired in order to secure 
freedom to operate, the marketplace has allowed companies that do not 
develop technology or products to exploit their freedom to litigate. 
Patent-assertion entities that do not have competing demands on their 
time and are invulnerable to countersuit have some advantages in patent 
litigation over practicing companies. These characteristics enable patent-
assertion entities to more credibly threaten to exercise the right to 
exclude conferred by a patent. 
II.  The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
Together, the patent arms race and patent marketplace form the 
basis of the “complex patent ecosystem.” While the “superpowers” of 
the patent arms race and patent-assertion entities of the patent 
marketplace represent two of the most visible players within the patent 
environment, today’s ecosystem features many kinds of entities, each 
with its own distinct business model, patent profile, and patent strategy. 
This Part describes the various practicing and non-practicing company 
types within the patent ecosystem, and the relationships between them. It 
describes how, although often cast as opposites, “arms race” (defensive) 
and “marketplace” (offensive) patent strategies are in fact closely 
related. 
A. Practicing Companies 
Companies that practice their inventions use patents in a variety of 
ways in the current patent ecosystem. Practicing companies that adopt a 
defensive stance obtain patents primarily to protect their product 
revenue,148 while companies that strategically or offensively assert their 
 
 145. Chien, supra note 5, at 1581. 
 146. Avancept, supra note 87, at 18. 
 147. About Us, PatentFreedom, http://www.patentfreedom.com/aboutus.html (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010). 
 148. See Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 56, 62 (Oct. 27, 2009). Apple’s income statement 
shows “sales” as the single category of income, which in turn is comprised of “revenue from the sale of 
hardware, software, digital content and applications, peripherals, and service and support contracts.” 
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patents use them to generate patent-related revenue.149 According to a 
common progression, patents acquired defensively to protect product 
revenues are turned into assets to generate patent revenues. 
1. Defensive Patenting Strategy 
Among modern high-tech companies that practice defensive 
patenting, Cisco is a good example.150 It generates its revenue from sales 
of its products151 and uses its patents “to defend its freedom to 
innovate.”152 This defensive strategy has consisted of obtaining a large 
portfolio of patents for cross-licensing in order to avoid licensing fees 
and to prevent competitors from blocking its products.153 Historically, 
Cisco did not charge royalties for use of its patents but had a policy of 
“sharing them as freely as possible,” in order to encourage 
interoperability with its networking products.154 
Sun Microsystems, which similarly uses its patents defensively, uses 
its “patent portfolio to protect communities[] and indemnify 
customers.”155 It embraces the open source movement, and has “freed 
more than 1,600 [of its] patents” to support open-source development.156 
The company’s approach has been to share, rather than to hold its 
patents. Sun’s decision to offer JavaScript for free, for example, has been 
described as a “mapping” strategy, in which a company finds an area of 
technology that is relatively free of existing rights and does not enforce 
its own proprietary rights, in order to create a standard in a new 
technology field.157 This control of the market can then be leveraged to 
make money by selling services (including advertising), licenses, or 
hardware.158 
In defensive contexts, patents are used to ward off suits, as well as to 
gain access to technology and to further technological adoption. By 
 
Id. at 62. 
 149.  Dan McCurdy, Out of Alignment-Getting IP and Business Strategies Back in Sync, in From 
Assets to Profits: Competing for IP Value and Return 6 (Bruce Berman ed., 2009). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Cisco Systems, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-k) (Sept. 10, 2009) (reporting that product sales 
generated 81% of Cisco’s income, specifically $29K million out of $36K million total). 
 152. Press Release, Stacy Williams, Cisco Patent Program Becomes Cornerstone of Continued 
Innovation (July 8, 2003), http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/ts_070803.html (quoting Robert Barr, Vice 
President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco 
Systems, Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. Jonathan Schwartz, Thank You, Network Appliance, Jonathan Schwartz’s Blog (Sep. 6, 
2007, 5:00 AM), http://blogs.sun.com/jonathan/entry/on_patent_trolling. 
 156. Patents Smart Assets, supra note 1, at 60. 
 157. Nermien Al-Ali, Comprehensive Intellectual Capital Management: Step-by-Step 147 
(2003). 
 158. Id. 
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joining patent pools and entering into related cross-licenses, a company 
can simultaneously gain rights to the technology of others and encourage 
use of its own inventions.159 
While companies that use patents for defensive purposes usually do 
not initiate lawsuits, their product revenues make them attractive 
litigation targets. Samsung and Apple, for example, which have been 
viewed as mostly defensive in their use of patents,160 are among the 
companies “most pursued” by patent-assertion entities.161 With arguably 
the most to lose and the least to gain from patent litigation, defensive 
patent companies have strong incentives to buy patents defensively162 and 
to lobby Congress for patent reform.163 
2. Offensive Patent Strategy 
In contrast to a primarily defensive strategy, in which patents are 
used to protect and grow product revenues, in an offensive patent 
strategy, companies use their patents to obtain IP revenues.164 At times, 
these patents are in areas in which the company no longer operates or 
never did. For example, a company may, when exiting a technology area, 
seek to license the technology in order to recoup past R&D expenses.165 
Or the company might have patented the technology at an early stage 
and never developed it. As to such patents, the patent owner is “non-
practicing.”166 When they assert such patents, companies have been 
accused of being corporate “trolls.”167 
General Electric (“GE”) is a good example. Although the company 
did not engage in much licensing historically,168 in recent years, it has 
 
 159. See generally Josh Lerner et al., Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors: 
Evidence from Patent Pools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9680). 
 160. But see Nick Bilton, What Apple vs. HTC Could Mean, Posting to Bits, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 
2010, 7:00 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/what-apple-vs-htc-could-mean/ (describing a 
suit initiated by Apple against HTC, whose handsets use Google’s Android technology). 
 161. Ranking of Operating Companies by Number of NPE Lawsuits, PatentFreedom (Apr. 1, 
2010), https://www.patentfreedom.com/research.html. 
 162. Rachael King, Tech Giants’ New Way To Thwart Patent Suits, Bus. Wk. (Feb. 1, 2010, 
11:41 PM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2010/tc2010021_382392.htm 
(describing Cisco and Samsung as members of defensive buying company RPX). 
 163. See Patent Reform, Cisco, http://www.cisco.com/web/about/gov/markets/patent_reform.html 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 164. The term “IP revenue” refers to patent-related income generated by licensing, patent sales, 
and related uses of IP. 
 165. Bernice Lee et al., Chatham House, Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future? Intellectual 
Property and Energy Technologies 6 (2009), (describing such a practice as “divestiture licensing”). 
 166. See Chien, supra note 5, at 1577–78. 
 167. See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Litigators Corner: Is IBM a Patent Troll?, Intell. Prop. Today, 
May 2006, at 26, 26–27. 
 168. Wayne Reinke, Patents Should Be the Starting Point for a Solid Licensing Strategy, Mass High 
Tech (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2006/03/06/focus4-Patents-should-be-the-
starting-point-for-a-solid-licensing-strategy.html (“GE has historically limited the licensing of its 
patent portfolio. However, according to Jim Aloise, director of global licensing development at GE 
Chien_62-HLJ-297 (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2011 2:27 PM 
December 2010]           FROM ARMS RACE TO MARKETPLACE 323 
developed a business around patent enforcement through its “Trading 
and Licensing” or “CIF Licensing” division.169 In 2008, licensing revenues 
accounted for $291 million, reflecting an annual revenue growth of 15% 
from the previous year.170 GE’s strategy has been to focus on licensing 
non-core technologies in areas in which it is not currently practicing, like 
consumer electronics.171 Recently, CIF Licensing sued Agere Systems172 
and Lenovo173 over modem and MPEG-2 technology, areas outside of 
GE’s core business.174 
Other companies that make significant revenue from their patent 
portfolios include IBM, Lucent, TI, Kodak, Thompson, and Philips.175 
However, each follows its own unique approach. IBM, for example, uses 
its portfolio to access technology, as well as patent royalties;176 
historically, it has not resorted to litigation.177 Lucent has a large IP group 
that licenses technology to third parties before or after the technology 
has been commercialized.178 Patent licensing can be highly profitable, 
given its low marginal costs. 
Many practicing companies simultaneously use defensive and 
offensive patent strategies. In a number of settings, the defensive 
accumulation of patents has set in motion a progression that has resulted 
in their strategic licensing and enforcement. Take the example of Harris 
 
Licensing, GE has stepped up its efforts in licensing its technology over the past few years.”). 
 169. See Ellen Mann, CIF Brings Innovative Thinking and Resources to Their Customers, 
Financing Answer, July 2005, available at http://www.cefcorp.com/commequip/toolsandresources/ 
fajuly2005.pdf (describing the formation of Intellectual Property Group and explaining that it permits 
“customers to take advantage of intangible assets such as patents, trademarks and other intellectual 
property that might otherwise lie dormant, or expire without proper commercialization” and 
describing one such campaign undertaken for Motorola); see also Phil Milford, GE Licensing Wins 7.6 
Million Patent Award from LSI, Bloomberg (Feb. 17, 2009, 21:47 EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=MOT:US&sid=a48zmrkP.LxI (describing successful 
patent infringement suit brought by GE licensing unit, “CIF Licensing”). 
 170. General Electric. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 85 (Feb. 19, 2009). 
 171. See Reinke, supra note 168. 
 172. Milford, supra note 169. 
 173.  Complaint, CIF Licensing, L.L.C. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 09 CV 1849 (S.D.N.Y, Feb. 27, 
2009).  
 174. General Electric Company Profile, Hoovers, http://www.hoovers.com/company/ 
General_Electric_Company/rfjyci-1.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (noting that GE’s core business is 
broad, including aircraft engines, medical imaging equipment and kitchen and laundry appliances, but 
does not encompass modem and MPEG technologies). 
 175. McCurdy, supra note 149, at 7. 
 176. Id. at 9–10. For one view that it is, see Hosteny, supra note 167, at 27. 
 177. Phelps & Kline, supra note 35, at xi, 27 (stating that while Marshall Phelps ran IBM’s IP 
organization from 1971–2000, he “never sued anybody”). 
 178. Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on 
Innovation, 16 Info. Econ. & Pol’y 135, 141 (2004) (“Lucent Technologies . . . has an intellectual 
property business group with 266 employees to make a profit from . . . companies that come to [it] . . . .” 
(quoting David Rubenstein, Patent Profits, Industry Wk. (Nov. 2, 1998), http://www.industryweek.com/ 
articles/patent_profits_102.aspx)). 
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Corporation, a public information technology company that sells 
hardware and software products.179 As its Vice President of Intellectual 
Property, Leslie Hart, testified in 2002, the company started out by 
having “no patents and . . . and building infringing product.”180 Once the 
company started generating revenues, it became the subject of demands 
for royalties from companies like AT&T and Bell Laboratories.181 Harris 
built up its defensive portfolio to defend itself against future demands.182 
At some point, the company had a critical mass of patents that could be 
used not only defensively but to generate royalties.183 
In another example, American Express developed a defensive 
program in direct response to business patent lawsuits that were brought 
after the State Street decision in 1998.184 As the company began to protect 
its IP “just defensively,” it began to realize value from its portfolio.185 
These activities proved so lucrative that patent enforcement grew into a 
full line of business within the corporation, with its own bottom line 
profit and loss statement and financial targets.186 The Xerox 
Corporation’s formation of the Xerox IP Operations business line in 
1998 was similarly motivated by a desire to develop an active patent 
licensing program based on a large arsenal of patent assets.187 In a similar 
vein, Lucent’s licensing business line is tasked with making profits from 
licensing patents and with providing a good return on the company’s 
investments in R&D.188 
Some practicing companies have formed ventures to enforce their 
patents. Sisvel, for example, is a company that licenses the patents of the 
consumer electronics company Philips, among others.189 The company US 
Ethernet Innovations, located in Tyler, Texas, was formed in order to 
assert the patents of the 3Com Corporation,190 which makes networking 
 
 179. Harris Corp., http://www.harris.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 180. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Joint Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 42 (Apr. 9, 2002) [hereinafter 
Competition FTC Hearing V] (statement of Leslie Hart, Vice President of IP, Harris Corp.), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020409ftctrans.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 41. 
 182. Id. at 42. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Evolving Marketplace II, supra note 76, at 38 (statement of Tracey R. Thomas, Chief IP 
Strategist and License Negotiator, American Express Co.). For the decision, see State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 185. Evolving Marketplace II, supra note 76, at 38 (statement of Tracey R. Thomas, Chief IP 
Strategist and License Negotiator, American Express Co.). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Rivette & Kline, supra note 15, at 59–60. 
 188. Id. at 125. 
 189. About Us: History, Sisvel, http://www.sisvel.com/english/aboutus/history (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010). 
 190. U.S. Ethernet Innovations, http://www.usethernetinnovations.com (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010). 
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equipment.191 It sued twenty-three companies in 2009 and 2010, including 
Hewlett Packard (HP), Sony, and Toshiba, and was later acquired by 
HP.192 
Figure 1: Exemplary Stages in a Company’s Patent Strategy 
 
Figure 1 represents several possible stages in a company’s patent 
strategy, from startup to defensive accumulation to offensive assertion. 
Though few companies have traversed the complete pathway, the 
experiences of American Express and Harris demonstrate the lure of 
doing so. Patent portfolio building is expensive, and patent enforcement 
provides one way to subsidize it. Companies that do not have the time, 
culture, or wherewithal to enforce their own patents can, at least in 
theory, sell their patents to someone who will. The proceeds from patent 
enforcement can be used, in turn, to reward inventors and underwrite 
company operations.193 It could be argued that patent enforcement 
programs, by providing a return on R&D expenses,194 can underwrite and 
therefore encourage socially desirable innovation.195 
 
 191. Corporate Information: 3Com @ a Glance, 3Com, http://www.3com.com/corpinfo/en_US/ 
index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 192. U.S. Ethernet Innovations, supra note 190. 
 193. Evolving Marketplace II, supra note 76, at 43 (statement of Laura G. Quatela, Chief IP 
Officer & Vice President, Eastman Kodak Co.) (“We’ve begun to sell patents with a targeted program 
and a staff to support it recently for two reasons. First is to fund the transformation that the company 
is experiencing from an analog manufacturing space to a digital space, which is a highly expensive 
transformation, and the second reason is to give our inventors some sense of accomplishment if their 
inventions are not commercialized. There is a very real tangible satisfaction rate that goes along with 
picking patents that the company won’t practice and putting them out on the market and realizing the 
return for the shareholder.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Bassuk, Patents, Standards, and Licensing: Working (Well) Together at 
Texas Instruments 2 (Jan. 29, 2010) (article presented at AIPLA’s 33rd Mid-Winter Institute Program: 
IP Licensing), available at http://www.aipla.org/html/mw/2010/papers/Bassuk_Paper.pdf (“TI gets and uses 
patents under three guiding principles, [including] . . . earning a return on our investment in research 
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However, making the transition from defensive accumulation to 
patent monetization is neither easy nor automatic. The patents that a 
company is willing to license may not have commercial value. Even if the 
patents are being practiced, a company may have neither the means nor 
the inclination to pursue infringers or possible technology partners. As 
described earlier, the patent market currently includes too many patents 
for too few buyers.196 Unless the leadership within a company views 
patents as a strategic asset,197 it is more likely than not that the company 
will stay in a “defensive” mode. 
Only time will tell whether the companies currently perceived to be 
practicing defensive patent strategies will shift their models over time. 
Sun, for instance, has offered a number of its patents for sale through 
public auction,198 suggesting that their defensive patents may not always 
remain so. The paragraphs above describe the diversity of practicing 
company models, from defensive, to offensive, to hybrid models in 
between. 
B. Non-Practicing Entities 
Entities that do not practice their patents operate along a wide 
spectrum of business models. Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold have 
developed a taxonomy of twelve types of patent holders, eleven of which 
are non-practicing.199 One industry veteran divides non-practicing entities 
into three main categories: entities that litigate, entities that license, and 
individual inventors.200 Some non-practicing entities are considered 
“trolls,” while others arguably should not be.201 
 
and development.”).  
 195. However, they also come at a cost to society, through the disincentives provided to the 
commercializing infringer, who may in fact have independently invented the technology. If litigated 
inventions are representative of all patented inventions, then most infringers are likely to be 
independent inventors. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law 2 
(Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 1270160, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270160 (“A surprisingly small percentage of patent cases involve even 
allegations of copying, much less proof of copying.”). 
 196. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 197. See, e.g., Phelps & Kline, supra note 35, at 138 (“The average grade for the executive 
management of patents today is probably a D-minus. Most patents are not managed at all; they just sit 
there.” (quoting Nathan Myrhvold)); Sharon Oriel, Hooking the Corporation on the Value of 
Intellectual Assets, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 91, 91 (finding most companies are 
focused on creating and obtaining patents, but do not realize the significant income they are missing 
by ineffectively managing their portfolio). 
 198. See infra notes 342–46 and accompanying text. 
 199. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the 
Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 10 tbl.1 & n.20 (2009) (showing twelve entity-status 
classes). 
 200. McCurdy, supra note 17, at 80–81 (describing various actors in the “Patent Troll Realm”). 
 201. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Trolls? 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 611, 
612 (2008). 
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The difficulty with determining what to call entities that do not 
practice their patents is the wide diversity of what they actually do. 
Although most entities use patents in a variety of ways, below I place 
various non-practicing entities into categories based on how they 
primarily use patents. Research and development entities, for example, 
use patent license fees to fund technology development; patent-assertion 
entities, in contrast, primarily use patents to get and distribute licensing 
fees, rather than to support the development or transfer of technology; 
defensive patent trusts acquire patents so that they will not be used to 
sue their licensees; and startups acquire patents primarily in order to 
deter copying and attract financing. As a company’s business model 
evolves over time, the company may move from one category to another. 
1. Research and Development Entities 
A research and development entity is a non-practicing patentee that 
develops its own technology. This category includes universities, who 
patent the inventions developed in their labs and on their campuses in 
order to earn licensing revenues and to facilitate technology transfer.202 
Universities generally license rather than assign their technology but also 
at times enforce their patents in the courtroom.203 The category of R&D 
entity includes companies like Tessera, Rambus, and Qualcomm, that, 
like universities, also manage large research budgets, but in a corporate 
setting. These companies supply upstream technology to manufacturers, 
rather than make it themselves.204 
While R&D entities have been accused of being trolls, their primary 
activity is the development of new technologies, which they support 
through technology licensing.205 The standard paradigm of university 
technology transfer is to license patents ex ante, as part of the larger 
technology transfer mandate of the university,206 rather than to wait until 
a company has independently developed and commercialized an 
infringing product.207 Three-quarters of Tessera’s employees are engaged 
 
 202. Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objective, Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A 
Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. Tech. Transfer 59, 65 (2001) (“The most important objective 
to the [technology transfer office] is clearly royalties and fees generated . . . .”). 
 203. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First 
Examination, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1519, 1525 (2009). 
 204. Letter from Teresa Stanek Rea, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law. Ass’n, to Suzanne 
Michel, Assistant Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/iphearings/540872-00045.pdf (“[T]echnology development companies . . . Qualcomm, 
Rambus, AmberWave, MOSAID, and Tessera . . . engage in research and development, but do not 
directly manufacture products.”). 
 205. Though they certainly have been accused of launching surprise attacks, too. See, e.g., Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., supra note 64, at 35, 37 (describing alleged “patent ambushes” by 
Rambus and Qualcomm). 
 206. See Thursby et al., supra note 202, at 70 (“Most inventions which evolve from university 
research are disclosed at a very early stage of development . . . .”). 
 207.  Ass’n for Univ. Tech. Managers, In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in 
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in R&D, and the company maintains a facility for and earns revenue 
from manufacturing optic products and components.208 Qualcomm also 
derives revenue from the sale of hardware which it manufactures by 
outsourcing to its many foundry partners.209 Rambus does not sell 
products210 but has a sizeable R&D budget and offers engineering 
services as part of the licenses it gives to the company’s technology.211 In 
these ways, these R&D entities are distinguishable from companies that 
focus primarily on patent assertion. 
However, with their large patent portfolios, R&D entities are well 
poised to shift their emphasis to enforcement. Canadian company Wi-
LAN, for example, decided in 2006 to change its focus from 
commercializing its technology to monetizing patents it has acquired 
from others, as well as those it has developed internally.212 MOSAID is 
another example of a company that has transitioned away from research 
and towards patent assertion.213 Although both companies still have 
R&D budgets, patent assertion has become their primary business.214 
2. Patent-Assertion Entities 
Patent-assertion entities are focused on the enforcement, rather 
than the active development or commercialization of their patents. 
Patent-assertion entities can be further divided into several types—large-
portfolio companies, small-portfolio companies, and individuals.215 
The largest of the patent-assertion portfolio companies are Acacia, 
IV, and John Desmarais’s Round Rock Research LLC.216 Acacia is a 
 
Licensing University Technology 6 (2007) [hereinafter Public Interest], http://www.autm.net/ 
Nine_Points_to_Consider.htm (“In considering enforcement of their intellectual property, it is 
important that universities be mindful of their primary mission to use patents to promote technology 
development for the benefit of society.”). 
 208. Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 240 (2009) (statement of Taraneh Maghame, Vice 
President, Tessera, Inc.). 
 209. Qualcomm, Third Quarter Fiscal 2010 Earnings (2010), available at 
http://investor.qualcomm.com/common/download/download.cfm?companyid=QCOM&fileid=388424& 
filekey=fceadfda-bfbc-4a41-a755-e5cbd606eeee&filename=Q310EarningsWebFINAL.pdf; Mark Lapedus, 
Qualcomm’s Foundry Push Closes Gap with TI, EE Times (Sept. 8, 2006, 11:50 AM EDT), 
http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4064790/Qualcomm-s-foundry-push-closes-gap-with-TI. 
 210. Rambus Reports Second Quarter Earnings, Bus. Wire, July 22, 2010, http://investor.rambus.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=491256. 
 211. Licensing, Rambus, http://www.rambus.com/us/about/licensing/index.html (last visited Dec. 
17, 2010). 
 212. Wi-LAN, http://www.wi-lan.com/company/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 213. James Bagnall, Ottawa’s Patent Power Outperforms, Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/business/Ottawa+patent+powers+outperform/3448044/story.html. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Brad Feld, The Typical Kinds of Software Patent Plaintiffs, FeldThoughts (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://www.feld.com/wp/archives/2010/04/the-typical-kinds-of-software-patent-plaintiffs.html 
(describing several classes of software patentee litigants including the “small fry troll,” “fund troll,” 
and “big fish troll” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 216. The last of which is described infra, at note 318 and accompanying text. 
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publicly traded company that, through its subsidiaries, enforces the 
patents of individual inventors, small companies, and even large 
companies seeking to monetize their patents.217 It generally splits the 
revenues it receives, giving half to the inventor and retaining half for 
itself,218 in a kind of “outsourcing” model. Acacia both licenses and 
litigates as part of its enforcement campaigns. Through its subsidiaries, 
the company was involved in 308 lawsuits from its founding in 1993 to 
2008219 and has generated $410 million in revenues.220 
IV acquires, develops, and licenses patents for fees and equity 
investments, at times resorting to litigation.221 It has purchased most of 
the patents in its 30,000-plus patent portfolio from all types of 
patentees—individual inventors, universities, nonprofits, big companies 
such as Enron, and failed startups.222 This portfolio has generated over $1 
billion. For example, in 2008 IV obtained $200–400 million from Cisco,223 
as well as $100 million in licensing fees and an additional $250 million in 
an equity investment from Verizon.224 In 2009 it secured a $120 million 
licensing deal with Intuit.225 To fund its activities, IV’s investors have 
committed billions of dollars in capital. They include both traditional 
 
 217. Acacia Techs., supra note 101, at 3 (“[P]atent owners who engage with us are primarily 
inventors and small companies who have limited resources to deal with unauthorized users, but 
include some large companies looking to turn their patents into revenue.”). 
 218. Letter from Paul Ryan, Chief Exec. Officer, Acacia Research, to Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 
13, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/iphearings/540872-00048.pdf. 
 219. McCurdy, supra note 17, at 80. 
 220. Acacia Techs., LLC Patent Licensing & Tech., http://acaciatechnologies.com/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 221. Don Clark & Dionne Searcey, Big Patent Firm Sues Nine Tech Firms, Wall St. J. (Dec. 9, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504576007444122372926.html (describing 
a suit brought by IV against technology companies). But see Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 46 (“While I 
don’t rule [litigation] out, I see it as a highly undesirable recourse for several reasons: It’s expensive, 
it’s unpredictable, and it takes years.”). 
 222. Victoria Slind-Flor, IV Moves from Myth to Reality, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Aug/Sept. 2006, at 
29, 32. 
 223. Amol Sharma & Don Clark, Tech Guru Riles the Industry By Seeking Huge Patent Fees, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 224. Verizon Communications Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 15 (June 30, 2008) (“During 
the second quarter of 2008, we entered into an agreement to acquire a non-exclusive license (the ‘IP 
License’) to a portfolio of intellectual property owned by an entity formed for the purpose of acquiring 
and licensing intellectual property. We paid an initial fee of $100 million for the IP License, which is 
being amortized over the expected useful lives of the licensed intellectual property. In addition, we 
executed a subscription agreement (with a capital commitment of up to $250 million to be funded as 
required through 2012) to become a member in a limited liability company (the ‘LLC’) formed by the 
same entity for the purpose of acquiring and licensing additional intellectual property. In connection 
with this investment, we will receive non-exclusive license rights to certain intellectual property 
acquired by the LLC for an annual license fee.”). 
 225. Intuit Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 24 (Apr. 30, 2009) (“On May 14, 2009, we entered 
into an agreement to license certain technology for total consideration of $120 million payable over 
the next ten fiscal years.”); Zusha Elinson, Intellectual Ventures and Intuit Work Out $120 Million Licensing 
Deal, Say Sources, Recorder, June 24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202431711930. 
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investors, such as pension funds, and Fortune 500 companies, whose 
relationships with IV may afford access to the technology in its 
portfolio.226 As such, IV embodies a “value added” model of patent 
holding—by aggregating rights in various technology areas, it can 
provide companies with greater freedom to operate through its patent 
licenses.227 When it does, IV arguably functions like a defensive patent 
fund.228 In addition to litigating, IV has sold patents to companies that 
have used its patents to do so.229 
Many patent-assertion entities have fewer patents. For example, 
Texas company Stragent LLC, which has targeted wireless companies,230 
Google,231 and Audi,232 is listed as the assignee on at least sixty U.S. 
patents or patent applications.233 Las Vegas-based Synchrome 
Technologies has sued Samsung, Panasonic and other electronics device 
makers based on a portfolio of fewer than ten patents.234 Patent-assertion 
entities have bought such portfolios in public auctions and then used 
them to sue others.235 
A number of independent inventors have turned their focus away 
from the active development or practice of their patents and have moved 
towards patent enforcement. At that point, they have become patent-
assertion entities. Independent inventors are among the most litigious 
actors in the patent system. According to one study, a single individual, 
Ron Katz, is an inventor on twenty of the top hundred most litigated 
 
 226. Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 44. Its investors include Microsoft, Apple, Google, and eBay. See 
supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 227. Public Interest, supra note 207. 
 228. To the extent it sells portfolios of patents to support the development of technology, IV, 
through some transactions, may also more closely resemble an R&D entity than a patent-assertion 
entity. 
 229. See, e.g., Elinson, supra note 125 (describing litigation by Picture Frame Innovations, LLC of 
patent acquired from an IV shell company). 
 230. Complaint at 1, Stragent, LLC v. Nokia Inc., No. 2:08-cv-293 (E.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (listing 
among others Nokia, Motorola, Palm, RIM, Sony Ericsson, AOL, Google, Microsoft, etc.). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Stragent Targets Slew of Tech, Car Cos. in IP Suits, Law 360 (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/165367 (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). 
 233. Based on a review of the assignment record, using the following link, sixty-five patents were 
found. Stragent, LLC and Stragent Technologies, LLC are presumed to be the same entity as they 
share identical address information. Assignments on the Web, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (use search term “stragent” in searchbox “Assignee 
Name”). 
 234. Steve Kanigher, Little Las Vegas Patent Firm Takes on Tech Giants, Las Vegas Sun (May 20, 
2010, 2 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/may/20/little-lv-patent-firm-takes-tech-giants/. 
Based on a review of the assignment record, using the following link, only seven patents were found. 
Assignments on the Web, U. S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/ 
?db=pat (use search term “synchrome” in searchbox “Assignee Name”). 
 235. Ewing, supra note 102, at 68 (“At least four patent lots purchased at auction by NPEs have 
been used in patent litigation.”). 
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patents of all time.236 Other famous independent inventor-litigants 
include Jerome Lemelson, discussed earlier,237 and Robert Kearns, whose 
dispute with U.S. car companies over intermittent windshield wiper 
technology was popularized in the movie, Flash of Genius.238 Microsoft 
cofounder Paul Allen has used the patents of his former startup, Interval 
Corporation, to sue high-profile internet companies.239 
While success in the courtroom varies, independent inventors tend 
to share certain characteristics. Often lacking the deep pockets of 
practicing companies, individual inventors are more likely to partner 
with contingency-fee lawyers in their patent-assertion campaigns.240 
Because they have often also developed the patents they assert, 
individual inventors are perceived to be more personally invested in the 
suits they bring than are companies who buy their patents in the 
marketplace.241 This may explain why such suits tend to last longer than 
those brought by other types of patentees.242 
3. Defensive Patenting Funds 
Some non-practicing entities buy patents defensively. Of the 
defensive aggregators, RPX is the largest. By February 2010, it had 
signed thirty-five members and spent more than $200 million to acquire 
1300 patents and patent rights, all in high-tech areas.243 After buying 
patents, the company licenses them to their members, who pay an annual 
fee which has been between $35,000 and $4.9 million for rights to RPX’s 
patent cache.244 RPX reserves the right to sell or license the patents, with 
perpetual licenses to its members.245 Following a similar business model, 
Allied Securities Trust (“AST”) buys and licenses patents to its members 
and then seeks to sell the patents with the licenses, within a year, 
 
 236. Allison et al., supra note 199, at 35–37. 
 237. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
 238. Flash of Genius (Universal Pictures 2008); see Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1543 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, New Yorker, Jan. 11, 1993, at 39, 39. 
 239. Dionne Searcey, Microsoft Co-Founder Launches Patent War, Wall St. J. (Aug. 28, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575385241453119382.html. 
 240. Sandburg, supra note 85, at 2 (“Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro . . . tends to represent little guys 
who can’t afford to litigate against major corporations.”). 
 241. Chien, supra note 5, at 1574. 
 242. Id. at 1605 tbl.6 (showing so-called “David v. Goliath suits,” suits initiated by independent 
inventors, as lasting 14.6 months on average, longer than any single category). 
 243. RPX Membership Jumps to 35 Companies, RPX (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.rpxcorp.com/ 
index.cfm?pageid=32&itemid=6 (“To date, RPX has invested over $200 million to acquire more than 1,300 
patents and patent rights in the mobile, Internet search, telecommunications, networking, consumer 
electronics, and e-commerce—including data and transaction processing—markets.”). 
 244. Id.; Larry Dignan, RPX: Can it Defend Against Patent Trolls?, ZDNet (Nov. 24, 2008, 4:11 
AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=10993. 
 245. The “Free Rider” Fallacy, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=14&itemid=8 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
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following a “catch and release” strategy.246 Following this business model, 
AST has reported that more than 80% of the money spent on patent 
acquisitions has been returned to its members.247 
While these trusts can reduce some risk for their members, it is hard 
to tell whether they will really make a dent. Even assuming that the few 
thousands of patents bought by these two consortia represent lawsuits 
avoided, patent-assertion entities like IV, which already has 30,000 
patents in its portfolio, are continuing to amass patents at a rapid pace.248 
The “release” portion of the aggregator strategy also arguably subjects 
non-members to greater risks from patent-assertion entities who must 
focus their efforts on fewer targets that do not belong to the trust. 
4. Startups 
Startups are recently formed companies that do not have a long 
operating history.249 Whether comprising a few founders or a multi-
person operation, individual startups are generally engaged in 
developing and commercializing their products.250 As such they are often 
not actively “practicing” their inventions but rather preparing to do so. 
In response to the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, startups reported that 
the main reasons they patent are to deter others from copying and to 
attract financing.251 The least important of several possible reasons for 
obtaining patents was to monetize them through licensing activities,252 
one way in which startups differ from patent-assertion entities. 
C. The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
Within the ecosystem occupied by the actors just described, no one 
paradigm—arms race or marketplace—dominates. Product companies 
that use patents solely to protect their revenue against competitors have 
become a minority. A wide variety of companies and patent uses have 
taken their place. The competing and even contradictory approaches of 
 
 246. Victoria Slind-Flor, Sun, eBay, Rock & Republic, Troyer: Intellectual Property, Bloomberg 
(July 1, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr= 
1149L:US&sid=aI70xRS4IR9w (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 247. Allied Security Trust Announces Availability of Major Patent Portfolio: Providing Opportunity 
for Anyone to Take a License Prior to the Upcoming Portfolio Sale, Marketwire (Jan. 26, 2010, 9:00 
AM), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Allied-Security-Trust-Announces-Availability-Major-
Patent-Portfolio-Providing-Opportunity-1107124.htm. 
 248. Steven Lohr, Turning Patents Into ‘Invention Capital,’ N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2010, at B1. 
 249. Antonio Davila et al., Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms, 18 J. Bus. 
Venturing 689, 690–91 (2003).  
 250. Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational 
Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 885, 894–95 (2010) (describing the process by 
which startups are created initially, by forming an idea, securing venture capital, and then using that 
capital to develop the original idea to become successful). 
 251. Graham et al., supra note 1, at 1299, fig.2 (2009). 
 252. Id. 
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the arms race and marketplace operate alongside each other, not only 
within industries, but also oftentimes within companies. A company may 
use certain patents defensively to gain freedom to operate, but it may 
also opportunistically sell its patents or sue upon them. It may enjoy 
patent détente with certain of its competitors while also exploiting the 
asymmetric stakes it has with companies whose products are covered by 
its patents. Some non-practicing entities sue established companies for 
infringement of patents they have acquired, and others develop their 
own technology and seek to commercialize it. Each company is unique, 
and the approach a company takes to its patents in one area may differ 
significantly from the approach it takes in another. These profiles make it 
harder to make value judgments about companies based solely on 
whether they do or do not practice their patents. 
III.  The Legacy of the Patent Cold War 
The previous two Parts describe the new complex patent ecosystem. 
The following three Parts explore its implications for the way we think 
about the patent system. In Part III, I explore the impact of defensive 
patenting on the new complex ecosystem. Defensive patenting has likely 
helped companies avoid some lawsuits.253 However, patent arsenals have 
left companies defenseless against patent-assertion entities and 
vulnerable to claims of other practicing companies that sue in areas 
where they do not practice. Defensive patenting has arguably also taken 
its toll on the patent system—driving the demand for low-quality patents, 
consuming company resources and time, and creating a large number of 
unused patents. These dynamics form the complicated legacy of the 
patent cold war for the new complex ecosystem. 
A. The Fallacy of Defensive Patenting 
Companies file for patents defensively in order to gain freedom to 
operate.254 However, the grant of a patent does not confer a positive right 
to practice one’s own inventions; rather, it gives patentees the right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling their inventions.255 
Defensive-patenting theory glosses over this distinction and equates 
patents with the positive right to practice instead of a negative right to 
exclude.256 In a “cold war” environment in which players patent and 
 
 253. Although it has not stopped companies from engaging in significant patent battles, for 
example, over 3G wireless technology, see Chien, supra note 5, at 1584, or smartphones, as described 
in Don Clark & Shayndi Raice, Corporate News: Tech Firms Intensify Patent Spats—Spate of Lawsuits 
Concentrate on Mobile-Phone Market as Rivals Aggressively Seek Strategic Edge, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 
2010, at B3. 
 254. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 60, at 52.  
 255. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). 
 256. I thank John Duffy for emphasizing this to me. 
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practice related inventions, however, this association approximates 
reality: a company’s patent portfolio protects it from attacks. 
Today’s complex patent ecosystem exposes the logical fallacy 
behind defensive patenting. The right to exclude has lost its force in a 
world that pits practicing companies against patent-assertion entities and 
corporate “trolls.”257 In the late 2000s, the share of all high-tech patent 
suits brought by non-practicing entities had risen to 20%.258 For some 
product companies, the proportion of suits brought by patent-assertion 
entities as compared to all suits has been much higher, comprising 
“virtually all” of them.259 As President Obama has said, “the threat of 
global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has 
gone up.”260 Many high-tech companies feel the same way about patent 
disputes: While company relations with competitors are relatively stable, 
they find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the demands of patent-
assertion entities.261 
B. A Partial Truce 
Although defensive patenting has been ineffective against patent-
assertion entities, it has likely contributed to the filing of fewer suits 
between competitors, certainly fewer than otherwise could have been 
filed over the past two decades. While it is hard to isolate the chilling 
effect attributable to the threat of retaliatory patent suits, as opposed to 
other deterrents to lawsuits such as company reputation, 
interdependence, and culture, the arms race almost certainly has made 
companies think twice before initiating litigation. Despite what has likely 
been the widespread cross-infringement of patents by companies in high-
tech industries, no company with a large patent portfolio has been driven 
out of business by patent litigation thus far. 
At the same time, however, defensive patenting has failed to bring 
about systemic “patent peace” between large companies. Suits between 
large companies262 over high-tech inventions represent 28% of all high-
 
 257. However, by obtaining a patent defensively, a company prevents someone else from obtaining 
a patent over the same invention and makes it harder for related inventions to be patented, by creating 
prior art. I thank Eric Friedman for making this point to me. 
 258. Chien, supra note 5, at 1604 fig.2 & n.168. Suits by individuals and nonprofits accounted for 
another 6% of suits in the dataset studied and were not included in this total. See id. at 1600 tbl.3. 
 259. Yen, supra note 138, at 2 (“[V]irtually all of the litigation activity has been with non-
practicing entities with no appreciable business of making or selling products or services.”). 
 260. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic 
(Apr. 5, 2009), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-
President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered. 
 261. Id. 
 262. I defined a “large company” as a public company or private company with an annual revenue 
of over $100 million. Chien, supra note 5, at 1612–14 app. A. 
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tech patent litigations.263 In a study of high-tech patent suits, I found that 
such suits were not only more common than other types of suits, but that 
they also lasted longer. On average, suits between large companies lasted 
14.0 months, while non-practicing suits took an average of 9.1 months to 
resolve.264 These results suggest that defensive patenting has, at best, 
brought about a partial patent peace among practicing companies. 
One reason for this may be that defensive patenting works best 
when the parties are equally matched, with portfolios that cover each 
other’s products. As noted earlier, the new patent ecosystem features a 
high degree of asymmetry between patentees. Do these asymmetries in 
exposure contribute to the large numbers of suits between large 
companies? To answer this question, I compared plaintiffs and 
defendants in large company suits265 and the high-tech industries they 
operated in, based on their NAICS and SIC codes.266 I then analyzed the 
extent of overlap between the companies. 
The results suggest that asymmetries between practicing companies 
are being exploited even in large company suits. Among the 575 
hardware and software “large company” lawsuits between 2000 and 2008, 
less than a third of the suits involved head-on competitors, that is, 
companies with the same primary industry segment (Table 1). While 
some 40% of the cases involved some overlap, nearly a third of disputes 
involved companies that had no overlapping lines of business at all. As a 
share of all disputes, this means that less than 9% of all high-tech suits 
studied267 involved large companies in the same primary line of business, 
while the remainder had some or no overlap. These findings are 
consistent with other empirical findings.268 To some degree, they show 
that the arms race is succeeding at deterring litigation—less than 10% of 
 
 263. Id. at 1603 tbl.5. In comparison, non-practicing entity suits comprised 19% of the total, and 
suits brought by individuals (“David versus Goliath” suits) comprised 4% of the total. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1605 tbl.6. 
 265. A suit in which the plaintiff and defendant each comprise a large company. See the 
methodology of identification described in Of Trolls, Chien supra note 5, at Part II.  
 266. Both code systems are used to describe various industries in U.S. commerce; the NAICS 
system was developed more recently. See North American Industry Classification System, US Census 
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (“The North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in 
classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical 
data related to the U.S. business economy. NAICS was developed under the auspices of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), and adopted in 1997 to replace the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) System.”). 
 267. That is 29% of large company suits (referred to in the paper as “Sport of King” suits), which 
themselves comprised 28% of all high-tech suits. See infra tbl. 1. 
 268. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion 18 tbl.3 (Bos. Univ. 
School of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=831685 (reporting that, among the 680 suits between public companies the authors studied, 
29% involved “true competitors” in the same industry, 43% had overlapping product lines, and 28% 
had no industry overlap, based on comparison of party SIC codes). 
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all suits involved large companies in the same technology areas. 
However, they are also striking, because they provide empirical evidence 
that large companies are exploiting asymmetries in the patent system by 
targeting companies whose businesses differ, in some cases significantly, 
from their own. 
Table 1: Industry Overlap in Patent Litigations Between Large 
High-Tech Companies from 2003 to 2008 (n = 575) 
Extent of 
Industry Overlap 
Match of Primary 
Industry Segment 
Non-primary 
Industry Segment 
Overlap 
No Overlap  
NAICS 29% 39% 32% 
SIC 30% 39% 31% 
 
While the data reported in Table 1 describes various types of high-
tech suits, it does not measure “avoided” suits. Patent licenses can serve 
as a proxy for such suits insofar as they represent patent truces reached 
without resort to litigation. The literature on patent pools, voluntary 
organizations whose purpose is to “pool[] a group of patents into a single 
licensing package,”269 provides insight into why negotiations between 
parties may break down. 
Patent pools that represent a “preemptive attempt to 
quash . . . [patent] fighting”270 have the same aims as defensive patenting. 
Though they come in many varieties, pools that feature vertically 
integrated firms essentially act as large industry cross-licenses.271 In such 
pools, contributors to the pool both own the patent and manufacture the 
technology and therefore, pay into and receive royalties from the pool. 
However, patent pools can fail when parties “can’t decide who gets what. 
Everyone thinks their portfolio is more valuable . . . .”272 Rather than 
opting into a patent pool, a non-joiner may choose to press for licenses 
on its own terms or to reserve the right to litigate.273 Thus, even when 
company portfolios overlap, they rarely will be equally matched, either in 
 
 269. Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not To Join: Examining Patent Pool 
Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, Int’l J. Indus. Org. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945189. 
 270. Maisie Ramsay, Diving into the LTE Patent Pool, Wireless Week (May 20, 2009), 
http://www.wirelessweek.com/Articles/2009/05/Diving-Into-the-LTE-Patent-Pool/ (“‘[The proposed 
patent pools] are merely a preemptive attempt to quash the type of IPR fighting that happened in 3G 
and grow adoption for the technology,’ says James Brehm, analyst with Frost & Sullivan.” (alteration 
in original)) . 
 271. Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 269, at 13 (“Vertically integrated firms manufacture 
products embodying the standard and so they benefit from pools through lower costs in cross-licensing 
the necessary patents.”). 
 272. Ramsay, supra note 270 (quoting Derek Aberle, President of Technology Licenses, 
Qualcomm). 
 273. Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 269, at 6. 
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reality, or in the opinion of the parties. Sometimes, for competitive 
reasons, companies will want injunctions, not royalties. Such factors will 
lead companies to initiate litigation, even against defendants with large 
portfolios. 
C. The Impact of the Patent Arms Race on the Patent System 
The promise of the patent arms race is more patents and fewer 
lawsuits. While defensive patenting has likely led to fewer of certain 
types of lawsuits, it has unequivocally led to more patents. Although 
companies build patent portfolios for many reasons,274 defensive motives 
in particular drive the accumulation of large numbers of low-cost patents. 
Other motives for building patent portfolios are less likely to be 
associated with large patent portfolios and the companies that acquire 
them. The large companies that top the list of patentees,275 year after 
year, do not generally need to file for patents in order to attract 
investment or to signal the company’s value—there are more direct 
measures of their performance, including revenue and new product 
introductions. Patents are needed, however, to cross-license, deter 
litigation, and prevent others from patenting the same invention. As one 
panelist commented during the 2009 FTC hearings, “from a defensive 
perspective having a portfolio that has heft and [is] perceived to have 
critical mass is really important.”276 In today’s complex patent ecosystem, 
from a defensive perspective, size still matters.277 
In this Part, I consider the impact of defensive patenting on the 
patent system. Scholars have previously worried that excessive patenting 
is problematic, because it drives up the cost of entry for small firms.278 
While empirical research suggests that entry into the software industry 
 
 274. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 63, at 31–39 (citing scale and diversity features 
of patent portfolios); see also Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 
23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1063, 1063–70 (2008) (listing reasons, including maintaining supra-competitive 
prices, generating license revenue, developing an arsenal for cross-licensing, securing investment and 
financing, shielding, bullying, blocking and preemptively patenting, substituting for nondisclosure 
agreements, and enhancing a company’s image). 
 275. In 2009, for example, the top companies were IBM, Samsung, Hitachi, Microsoft, Canon, 
Intel, Panasonic, Toshiba, Fujitsu, and Sony. Intell. Prop. Owners Ass’n, Top 300 Organizations 
Granted U.S. Patents in 2008 1 (2009), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=22339. 
 276. Evolving Marketplace III, supra note 57, at 128 (statement of Horacio E. Gutierrez, 
Corporate Vice President & Deputy General Counsel, Microsoft Corp.). 
 277. See, e.g., Evolving Marketplace I, supra note 40, at 87 (testimony of Sarah Harris, Vice 
President & Chief IP Counsel, AOL LLC) (“[AOL] ha[s] been able to come back and use our 
portfolio defensively, so that’s really promoted and encouraged us to continue filing more patent 
applications . . . .”); id. at 83 (testimony of Russ Slifer, Chief Patent Counsel, Micron Technology, Inc.) 
(describing that the need for a large portfolio continues to drive filing for a large number of patents). 
 278. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation 53 (1988) ([T]he true value [of a 
patent grant] is negative because it requires all to assume the overhead burden of defensive 
patenting.”).  
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has remained robust, and that researchers in other industries have not in 
fact been deterred by “over” patenting,279 I argue that the practice of 
defensive patenting has had other, largely overlooked, side effects. These 
side effects contribute to the problem of low patent quality and create 
large numbers of unused patents that, in today’s complex patent 
ecosystem, ironically have the potential to increase, rather than to 
decrease, patent hold-up. 
1. High-Volume, Low-Cost, and Quality Patenting 
If a patentee plans to hold the majority of its patents defensively, 
rather than to assert or enforce them offensively, the patents do not need 
to be high-quality. Since the patents are unlikely to ever be tested in 
court, or even in a licensing negotiation, the quantity of patents, rather 
than the quality of any individual patent, is more important. For this 
reason, companies that patent defensively have adopted a high-volume, 
low-cost approach to building their portfolios.280 They invest a limited 
amount of company time in each patent and are unlikely to conduct pre-
patentability searches.281 Fixed-fee, fee cap, and volume pricing 
arrangements may be used to reduce costs.282 According to a 2008 
account, a typical high-volume, low-cost patent filing program was priced 
at around $7500 per application and $1800 per U.S. office action 
response,283 about 25% less than the average.284 When companies make it 
their objective to file for a certain number of patents285—whether set by 
investor expectations, competitive benchmarking, or another process—
the focus tends to be on the question, “what can I patent?” instead of 
“what is this patent’s strategic objective?” 
The limited investment made in each individual patent contributes 
to lower-quality examination as well, making it less likely that patentees 
will take the time to provide meaningful information to the USPTO 
 
 279. Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the Software Industry 12–13 (Aug. 1, 2006) 
(unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=926204; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?: Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1059, 1061 (2008) (describing empirical studies that suggest fears that 
upstream patents will deter downstream research have largely failed to materialize); Ronald J. Mann, 
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 961, 968 tbl.1 (summarizing 
the positive effects of patents for prerevenue startups, later-stage startups, and large firms).  
 280.  See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 63; see also Craig Opperman & Carina 
Tan, Getting Less for More, Intell. Asset Mgmt., Dec./Jan. 2008, at 8, 8–9, (discussing low-cost, 
volume-based patenting). 
 281. Sterne et al., supra note 15, at 22. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Opperman & Tan, supra note 280, at 8–9. 
 284. As compared to an average price of $10,993 for a relatively complex new electrical/computer 
application and $3165 for an amendment/argument. Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the 
Economic Survey app. at I-73–I-74 (2007). 
 285. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the references they are obligated to disclose. The Public Patent 
Advisory Committee has commented,  
Candidly, a further cause of ever-increasing pendency is clearly 
applicants’ behavior itself. From . . . the late filing of information 
disclosure statements (IDS), to the failure to file any illuminating 
information, or the inclusion of large numbers of less relevant 
references in such statements, applicants severely and directly impact 
an examiner’s ability to perform focused, timely and quality 
examinations.286 
When a company begins to patent, its first priority is to protect its 
“platform” or “pioneering” technologies. Along with patents on new 
innovations, a company will defensively acquire non-core, “portfolio-
builder” patents that cover smaller, more incremental inventions, which 
are further removed from the company’s core operations and represent 
inventions with limited commercialization potential.287 The net effect is 
that patents acquired primarily for defensive reasons are likely not only 
to have received less time and attention, but also to cover less important, 
more marginal inventions. By creating a demand for patents that are 
never intended to be enforced, the patent arms race has arguably 
contributed to the problem of low-quality patents. 
2. Patent Backlog 
Defensive patenting has also been blamed for exacerbating backlog 
at the USPTO.288 Although average pendencies have grown across the 
board,289 applications examined in the computer software, architecture, 
and communications technology centers at the USPTO have had to wait 
significantly longer to receive examination. In 2008, for example, the 
USPTO took five-to-seven months longer to begin examination of 
applications in these technology areas, and they spent nearly a year 
longer in examination, on average.290  
Not surprisingly, in the technology areas where backlog has been 
the longest, exceptionally strong growth in new applications has also 
 
 286. 2007 USPTO Ann. Rep. 10 [hereinafter USPTO Ann. Rep.] (“[Fee] diversion, a larger 
percentage of complex applications, and applicant behavior have combined to create the ‘perfect 
storm’ of factors leading to historic levels of unexamined patent applications.”). 
 287. See, e.g., Bill Barrett, Defensive Use of Publications in an Intellectual Property Strategy, 
20 Nature Biotechnology 191, 192 (2002) (discussing the strategy of patenting “incremental 
inventions”). 
 288. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 675 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President 
for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.). 
 289. USPTO Ann. Rep., supra note 286, at 9 (describing increases in overall pendency from 
twenty-five months in 1999 to thirty-two months 2007, and up to forty-three months in some art areas). 
 290. Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2008: Table 4: Patent Pendency Statistics, 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/ 
oai_05_wlt_04.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (showing applications examined in the computer 
architecture, software, and information security and communications technology centers as having 
longer times to first action and a longer average pendency than any other in the USPTO). 
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occurred. The percentage of overall applications in these areas doubled 
or tripled between 1990 and 2005 (Figure 2).291 The growth of these new 
applications has apparently outpaced the USPTO’s ability to scale up its 
examination resources. 
Figure 2: New Patent Applications at the USPTO 
 
Although it is unclear how much of the blame patentees really 
deserve for the backlog, a lack of focus on the applicant side can slow the 
examination process. The backlog impacts all users of the system, as 
important patent applications languish along with the less important ones 
in the line at the USPTO.292 
3. Patent Stockpiles 
Another consequence of the patent arms race is that it has left 
practicing companies with large numbers of unused patents. By unused, I 
mean that these patents are not being practiced and lack strategic 
value.293 BTG International has found that two-thirds of all U.S. firms 
have patent assets that they fail to exploit.294 According to one estimate, 
“at least 20 percent of [most significant patent portfolios] could be sold 
with no negative impact on the IP position, either offensively or 
defensively.”295 As described earlier, the cultural barriers that have 
 
 291. Patent Application Full Text and Image Database, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). The table was 
created based on the information in this database. 
 292. See expansion of this sentiment in Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 681 
(statement of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.). 
 293. See, e.g., Davis & Harrison, supra note 22, at 145 (describing Dow’s classification, in 1993, of 
its patents into three categories, including “No Business Interest (available for licensing, allow to 
expire, abandon),” and noting that 25% of its patents proved to be in this category). 
 294. Phelps & Kline, supra note 35, at 138. 
 295. McCurdy, supra note 149, at 15. 
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historically prevented practicing companies from selling their patents 
have begun to disintegrate. As they do, more companies have made their 
patents available for sale.296 
The patent marketplace now provides a way for companies to 
dispose of their unused patents. However, it also creates a risk that the 
patents will be used to hold-up other practicing companies, at a cost that 
far exceeds what the practicing company itself could have demanded for 
the patent. As Brian Kahin has said, the new patent environment is 
characterized by a “growing temptation to release patents from 
portfolios to those who can make ‘better’ use of them,” without fear of 
public reprisal, counter-assertions, or repeated interactions with 
competitor targets.297 As detailed below in Part IV.A, a number of 
corporate origin patents have been sold to entities that have turned 
around and asserted them against other practicing companies. 
D. The Legacy of the Patent Arms Race 
In sum, then, the patent arms race has had impacts on the patent 
system that extend beyond the simple formula of more patents, fewer 
lawsuits. While deterring some suits, patent arsenals have left companies 
defenseless against patent-assertion entities, which do not create 
anything, as well as against practicing companies, who sue in areas where 
they do not operate. Defensive patenting has also taken its toll on the 
patent system—driving the demand for low-quality patents and creating 
a large number of unused patents. While these developments do not 
justify the wholesale abandonment of defensive patenting, which has had 
some deterrent effect, they do reveal an overlooked contributor to 
patent quality and patent hold-up problems: the patent arms race. 
IV.  Patent Pathways and Patent Value in the Complex Patent 
Ecosystem 
In the previous Part, I discussed the impact of the patent arms race 
on the complex patent ecosystem. In this Part, I address the implications 
of changes to the patent ecosystem for how patents are valued. 
According to an important strand of patent literature, a patent’s value 
and the related likelihood of litigation can be predicted by looking at the 
characteristics of the patent at the time of issue. Attributes such as the 
number of claims, time in prosecution, and amount of prior art cited by 
the patent are assumed to predict into which of two camps a patent will 
fall: “worthless”—likely to sit on the shelf and never to be enforced—or 
“valuable.”298 
 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2.a; supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Kahin, supra note 6, at 11. 
 298. See, e.g., John Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 436–37 (2004) (developing a 
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Several proposals to address patent quality are built around the core 
assumption that certain patents are objectively more valuable than 
others, and that this can be determined prospectively.299 One proposal is 
deferred examination, which assumes that patent applicants can tell 
which patents are important during the patent prosecution process.300 
Another proposal is to “gold-plate” patent prosecution, which would 
require patent applicants to elect which track a patent should be 
examined during prosecution.301 
However, in the current complex patent ecosystem, a patent may 
change hands several times during its life. As a patent traverses its patent 
“pathway,” it gains a new context and a new purpose. The value a 
patentee is likely to extract from a patent by asserting it against others—
what I call the “exclusion value” of a patent—can fluctuate considerably 
as the patent is sold. In the following paragraphs, I describe several cases 
and mechanisms by which patents have gone from defensive to offensive, 
and vice versa, as they have been bought and sold on the patent 
marketplace. I then discuss the implications of these patent pathways for 
theories of patent value. 
A. Offensive Uses for Defensive Patents 
As described earlier, companies have found a number of ways to 
offensively assert portfolios of patents initially developed defensively. A 
number of companies, like Harris and American Express, have found it 
profitable to enforce, through licensing, their once defensive portfolios.302 
Others, like General Electric, have organized company subsidiaries to 
sue companies in technology areas in which they do not practice.303 
Practicing company patents, when sold on the market, can also end up 
being asserted by patent-assertion entities. In a forthcoming study of 
patents litigated by the “most litigious” patentees, Risch reports that 
 
profile of valuable patents based on an empirical analysis); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1507 n.55 (2001) (estimating that only 5% of patents are the 
subject of licensing and 1.5% are the subject of litigation, and noting that the balance is largely 
ignored); Kimberley Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1521, 1522–25 (2005). 
 299. Allison, supra note 298, at 438 (“Our data conclusively demonstrate that valuable patents 
differ in substantial ways from ordinary patents both at the time the applications are filed and during 
their prosecution.” (emphasis added)). 
 300. See, e.g., Steven Bennet & David Kappos, Inside Views: Deferred Examination: A Solution 
Whose Time Has Come, Intell. Prop. Watch (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/ 
03/12/inside-views-deferred-examination-a-solution-whose-time-has-come/ (describing deferred 
examination as a process in which applicants can decide which applications are “most important” and 
which are less important). 
 301. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 50 (2007); see also Mark A. Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, 
Regulation, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12. 
 302. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 303. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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over a third came from public companies or their subsidiaries.304 Some of 
the more prominent examples of corporate-origin patents being asserted 
by patent-assertion entities are discussed below. 
Saxon Innovations is a patent-assertion entity that has brought 
enforcement actions in U.S. district court and in the International Trade 
Commission.305 Its campaigns are based on a patent portfolio comprised 
of nearly 200 patents covering technology developed by chipmaker 
Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”).306 Saxon acquired the patents in 
2007 by acquiring Legerity, an AMD spinoff, from another company 
called Zarlink.307 Using these patents, Saxon has obtained licenses from 
LG Electronics Inc., HTC Corporation, Nokia Corporation, and 
Research In Motion Limited308 and sued Apple,309 Nokia,310 Casio,311 and 
Samsung.312 
Similarly, around fifty patents of Conexant, a publicly traded 
semiconductor company that makes integrated circuits for various 
electronic devices,313 have ended up in the hands of a three-person 
patent-enforcement entity called WiAV, LLC.314 The assignment history 
of the patents reveals a convoluted past. From Conexant, which was once 
a subsidiary of Rockwell International Corporation, the patents were 
assigned to Washington Sub, a wholly owned subsidiary that merged into 
Alpha Industries and then changed its name to Skyworks Solutions, 
Inc.315 Skyworks’ patents were then assigned to WiAV.316 Using this 
 
 304. See Michael Risch, Untitled Empirical Study of Non-Practicing Entities 18–19 (unpublished 
manuscript) (draft on file with author). 
 305. Saxon Innovations Files Complaint in International Trade Commission, Saxon Innovations, 
LLC (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.saxoninnovations.com/Press.html (select link entitled “Saxon 
Innovations Files Complaint in International Trade Commission”). 
 306. About Saxon Innovations, LLC, Saxon Innovations, LLC, http://www.saxoninnovations.com/ 
About.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 307. Zarlink Semiconductor Inc., Material Change Report (Form 51-102F3 ) 4 (June 25, 2007). 
 308. Altitude Capital Partners Sells Saxon Innovations, PR Newswire (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/altitude-capital-partners-sells-saxon-innovations-84701297.html. 
 309. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Saxon Innovations, L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc., No. 08-CV-00265-
JDL (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2009). 
 310. Saxon Innovations, L.L.C. v. Nokia Corp., No. 6:07-CV-490, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89933, at 
*1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009) (asserting, for example, patent 5247621). 
 311. Complaint at 1, Saxon Innovations, L.L.C. v. Casio Computer Co., No. 09-CV-00270)-LED 
(E.D. Tex. June 25, 2009) (asserting the same patent as it did against Nokia Corp.). 
 312. Complaint at 1, Saxon Innovations, L.L.C. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 09-CV-00067-LED 
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2009) (asserting, for example, patent 5235635). 
 313. About Conexant, Conexant, http://www.conexant.com/company/about.html (last visited Dec. 
17, 2010). 
 314. WiAV Solutions, LLC, http://wiavsolutions.com/ (“[WiAV] is in the business of developing 
advanced digital wireless technologies. [WiAV] also acquires, develops, licenses and enforces 
patents.”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2010); see also WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc, No. 3:09cv447, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96994, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2009) (“[A]ll three of WiAV’s employees work 
out of the [company’s] Vienna office.”). 
 315. Conexant Systems Inc., Amended Current Report (Form 8-K/A) F-1 (Jul. 10, 2002). 
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Conexant-developed portfolio, WiAV has sued Motorola, Kyocera, 
RIM, and Apple, among others.317 
In the largest corporate patent sale to a patent-assertion entity to 
date, Micron, the largest U.S. maker of computer memory chips, sold 
4500 patents to seasoned patent litigator John Desmarais.318 The patents 
cover chipmaking, photo imaging, search, and radio frequency 
identification, and represent some 20% of Micron’s entire portfolio.319 
Desmarais’s law firm, Round Rock Research LLC, has offered the 
patents for license320 and sued at least one company.321 According to a 
study performed by CPA Global’s monetization specialist, a subset of the 
patents are of very high quality.322 Micron made the sale, according to its 
SEC filings, to help the company recoup some of its technology 
investments.323 Micron’s counsel has previously spoken publicly about the 
negative impacts of patent-assertion entities,324 opening the company up 
to potential charges of hypocrisy in entering into, and potentially 
continuing to have a stake in, Desmarais’s enforcement activities.325 
B. Defensive Uses for Offensive Patents 
The previous Part provides several examples of how defensive 
patents have been made available, through the patent market or 
corporate reorganization, for offensive campaigns. Trading in patents has 
created additional options for defensive strategies as well. When a 
practicing company is sued by another practicing company, it may be 
able to defend itself by buying patents from the marketplace. Companies 
 
 316. Based on a review of the assignment record, using the following link, eighty-eight patents 
were assigned by Skyworks to WiAV. Assignments on the Web, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&reel=019899&frame=0305 (use “019899” and 
“0305” in searchboxes “Reel” and “Frame” respectively). 
 317. See Complaint at 1, WiAV Solutions LLC v. Kyocera Corp., No. 09-CV-00373-REP (E.D. Va. 
June 15, 2009); Complaint at 1, WiAV Solutions LLC v. Research In Motion, Ltd., No. 08-CV-00627-
REP (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2008). 
 318. Kolker, supra note 88. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Zach Lowe, John Desmarais Takes First Shot as Patent Holder, Am. Law., Oct. 7, 2010, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202473041370&John_Desmarais_Takes_ 
First_Shot_as_Patent_Holder. 
 322. Gregoire Marino, More News on the Micron Patent Sale: What Is Really Happening Behind 
the Curtains?, IP Fin. (June 15, 2010), http://ipfinance.blogspot.com/2010/06/more-news-on-micron-
patent-what-is.html. 
 323. Micron Technology, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Oct. 28, 2009) (“[Micron] has recovered 
some of its investment in technology through sales of intellectual property rights to joint venture 
partners and other third parties.”). 
 324. See Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 685–86 (statement of Joel Poppen, Dir. of 
Patent Litigation & Licensing, Micron Technology, Inc.). 
 325. Joff Wild, The Questions that Micron Technology Will Not Answer, IAM Mag. (June 8, 2010), 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=4768d19e-571c-452b-ac56-a3ba9e22fe19. 
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can also use the marketplace to quickly adapt their patent portfolios to 
their defensive, or other, objectives. 
One of the main reasons for having a defensive portfolio is to give 
the holder of the portfolio a way to retaliate if it is sued. However, if the 
accused does not have patents relevant to the plaintiff’s operations, it 
may be able to turn to the patent marketplace. Several companies have 
successfully used this tactic to neutralize lawsuits brought against them. 
In Hewlett-Packard v. Acer, Inc., described below, the patents were held 
by patent-assertion entities before being used by a practicing company in 
its counter assertion against another practicing company. In Matsushita v. 
Samsung, a practicing company defendant bought a patent for defensive 
purposes from a patentee several months before it went bankrupt. 
In March 2007, Hewlett Packard brought a suit against rival 
corporation, Acer.326 Several months later, Acer bought several patents 
from Industrial Technology Research Institute,327 a Taiwanese research 
organization that licenses its technology.328 It asserted these in a 
countersuit against HP.329 By mid-2008, the lawsuit was settled.330 
In a suit filed on January 25, 2002 by Matsushita Electric against 
Samsung, Samsung counterclaimed for infringement of patent 
5,481,693.331 Samsung had bought the patent from SonicBlue Inc;332 
several months after the assignment, SonicBlue filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.333 Over the course of the litigation, Samsung also 
counterclaimed patents that it had previously obtained from a 
government agency334 and from other practicing companies.335 
 
 326. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acer, Inc., No. 02-07-CV-103-CE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25952, at *3 
(E.D. Tex Mar. 31, 2008). 
 327. See Patent Assignment Query Menu, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office [hereinafter 
Assignment History], http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search in “patent number” 
field for U.S. No. Patents “5977626”, “6188132”, “6788257”, “6280021”, showing execution dates to 
Acer in September and July of 2007). 
 328. Who We Are, Indus. Tech. Research Inst., http://www.itri.org.tw/eng/about/article.asp? 
RootNodeId=010&NodeId=0101 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 329. Erica Ogg, Acer Sues HP Again Over Patents, CNET News Blog (Oct 31, 2007, 3:40 PM 
PDT), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9808687-7.html. 
 330. Press Release, Hewlett Packard, HP and Acer Settle Patent Litigation (June 8, 2008), 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2008/080608a.html. 
 331. Brief of Plaintiff at 5, Matushita v. Samsung, No. 02-336, 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 
32374 (D.N.J. 2005) (“MEI initiated this action against Samsung alleging infringement of three patents 
on January 25, 2002. In response, Samsung asserted five counterclaim patents against MEI: the ‘048 
Patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,034,625 (‘the ‘625 Patent’), U.S. Patent No. 5,481,693 (‘the ‘693 Patent’), U.S. 
Patent No. 5,781,750 (‘the ‘750 Patent’), and U.S. Patent No. 6,076,155 (‘the ‘155 Patent’).”). 
 332. See Assignment History, supra note 327 (search in “patent number” field for U.S. No. Patent 
“5481693”, showing transfer from SonicBlue to Samsung with an execution date of 11/14/2002). 
 333. Eric Hellweg, SonicBlue’s Bankruptcy: Big Media Wins, CNNMoney.com (Mar. 27, 2003, 
10:26 AM EST), http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/27/technology/techinvestor/hellweg/index.htm (describing 
SonicBlue’s Chapter 11 filing). 
 334. See Assignment History, supra note 327 (search in “patent number” field for U.S. No. Patent 
5181209, which was assigned from a Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luft, Germany’s aerospace 
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The foregoing examples demonstrate how companies have used 
patents offered for sale on the patent marketplace to supplement their 
own portfolios. In each case, a defendant company used a patent that had 
been bought, rather than developed internally, to counter a lawsuit. 
During litigation, a single relevant patent can be worth more than the 
contents of a large portfolio. As long as the right patents are available for 
sale, patentees can make acquisitions as-needed, relieving some of the 
pressure to anticipate and plan for disputes ex ante. 
The extent to which the strategy of acquiring patents “on demand” 
will be useful remains to be seen, however. Patents on the most advanced 
and unique technologies are unlikely to be available in the market. 
Companies in highly competitive industries will not release their “crown 
jewel,” or even their lesser-jewel patents to the market, unless they are 
certain that they will not have a future use for them. The patent market is 
far from transparent, resulting in a risk that buyers and sellers will not be 
able to find each other. Still, as more properties enter the patent 
marketplace, buyers will likely find it increasingly attractive to buy 
portions of their patent portfolios from others, rather than only build 
them themselves. 
C. Implications for Patent Valuation 
The “patent pathways” described above have implications for 
theories of patent valuation. Merchant banks and academics assume that 
patents have an objective value that can be estimated based on intrinsic 
qualities of the patent, such as the breadth of its claims, how much prior 
art it cites, and its prosecution history.336 However, such valuation 
approaches focus only on characteristics of patents at the time of issue 
and neglect to consider what happens afterwards. The transactions 
described above remind us, however, that the strategy of the company 
holding a patent is predictive of the value that is likely to be captured 
 
research center). 
 335. See id. (search in “patent number” field for U.S. No. Patent 5781750, assigned from 
SonicBlue). 
 336. James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What Is Patent Quality? A Merchant Banc’s 
Perspective, Les Nouvelles: J. Licensing Executive Soc’y Int’l, June 2008, at 123, 130, available at 
http://www.oceantomo.com/system/files/What_is_Patent_Quality_lesNouvelles_6.08.pdf (“In sample 
after sample, we find that higher patent maintenance rates are significantly correlated to the following: 
a larger number of independent and dependent claims; a smaller number of words per independent 
claim; a smaller number of different words per independent claim; longer written specifications; higher 
forward citation rates (both raw and age normalized); a larger number of backward citations; and a 
larger number of related patent family members (both domestic and international). More importantly, 
at least from a merchant banc’s perspective, the calculated maintenance probabilities are significantly 
correlated to other observed patent value measures, such as commercialization rates, licensing rates, 
and litigation rates.”); see also Allison et al., supra note 298, at 437–38 (describing valuable patents, 
defined as “litigated” patents, as being young, domestically owned, more cited and citing, spending 
longer in prosecution, and having more claims than ordinary patents). 
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from that patent. The exclusion value of a patent is related to, but still 
distinct from, any objective value of a patent. This concept reflects the 
reality that a patent in the hands of a patent-assertion entity is much 
more likely to be exploited offensively than is the same patent when held 
by a practicing company that makes its money selling products. 
This is not to say that approaches to objective patent valuation are 
not useful for those who transact in the patent marketplace and need to 
make quick assessments about the patents they buy or offer for sale. But 
for those making decisions about R&D and how to allocate scarce 
commercialization resources, the more relevant questions are, “which 
patents am I going to be sued upon?” and “how much value is likely to 
be captured from the patents that are in my technology space?” The 
marketplace allows barriers to exploitation of a patent that exist because 
of characteristics of the patent owner—for instance, due to a lack of 
resources or other revenue options, and vulnerability to countersuit—to 
be removed. The common-sense notion that who owns a patent is highly 
predictive, perhaps even the most predictive, of whether a patent will be 
asserted is worthy of empirical validation. A better understanding of 
these drivers of exclusion value could be instrumental in helping 
companies predict and potentially avoid technical areas where patent 
assertion is most likely. 
V.  Patent Reform in the Complex Patent Ecosystem 
Earlier Parts of this Article describe how the complex patent 
ecosystem calls into question existing formulations of defensive patenting 
and patent value. In Part V, I consider implications of the complex 
patent ecosystem for reforming the patent system. To do so, I briefly 
review the rise of the patent arms race and patent marketplace 
paradigms that form the basis of the complex patent ecosystem. This 
review exposes a thus-far overlooked lever of change within the patent 
system: patentees themselves. 
A. Behavioral Levers in the Patent Arms Race and Patent 
Marketplace 
One lesson taught by the history of both the arms race and the 
marketplace is that patentees are heavily influenced by the behavior of 
other patentees. For example, industry leadership, demonstration effects, 
and licensing practices have led firms to file for thousands of patents over 
the past two decades.337 Likewise, the business of patent assertion has 
been catalyzed, not by any single legal development, but by the 
development and popularization of creative business models based on 
 
 337. See supra Part I.A. 
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patent exploitation. In both cases, patentees have taken cues from their 
peers regarding how to patent, how much to patent, and how to use 
patents. They have observed and learned from each other’s litigation and 
licensing experiences. Demonstration effects are important and can 
change behavior. 
The insight that patentee behavior, independent of legal change, 
drives the patent system suggests new approaches for reforming the 
patent system. Conventionally, advocates and academics have 
concentrated their proposals for reforming the patent system on one of 
its three institutional pillars: Congress, the courts, and the USPTO. 
With respect to patent quality, for example, existing proposals for 
reforming the patent system are focused on improving the supply of 
patents—for instance, by restoring full funding to the USPTO, 
heightening the standards for patentability, or allowing third parties or 
the public to help vet patents before and after they are issued.338 
However, in the paragraphs below, I suggest ways in which the demand 
for patents might be changed. These suggestions would try to harness the 
self-interest of patentees, in order to improve patent quality.339  
Likewise, in order to reduce the patent hold-up associated with 
patent-assertion entities, companies have advocated making changes to 
patent law and procedure—for instance, by changing damages law, 
limiting where patentees can sue, and allowing the public to challenge 
patent applications before they issue.340 While important, the scope and 
pace of changes to damages and related law are unpredictable. In 
addition, while patent-assertion entities have skillfully navigated the 
legal environment, they have relied primarily on non-legal tactics, such as 
secrecy, surprise, and willingness to litigate, to succeed against practicing 
companies. Below I suggest some ways in which some of these 
advantages can be neutralized. 
B. Improving Patent Quality 
Despite its limitations, defensive patenting continues to be an 
important component of patent strategy. The following paragraphs 
discuss ways in which defensive objectives may be served, while at the 
same time shifting the emphasis away from volume patenting and 
towards quality patenting. 
 
 338. See generally Wegner, supra note 27 (describing a host of different patent quality proposals). 
 339. Making a related point, Polk Wagner argues that incentives to seek quality patents, and not 
merely legal tools, need to be leveraged to improve patent quality. Wagner, supra note 63, at 2144. 
 340. William New, New Senate Patent Reform Bill Details Released, Intell. Prop. Watch (Mar. 4, 
2010, 10:29 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/03/04/new-senate-patent-reform-bill-details-released/. 
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1. Practice and Publicize Quality Patenting 
As explained previously, one of the primary reasons companies 
acquire many patents is because their competitors do. While companies 
like IBM and Microsoft celebrate their patent issuances,341 highly 
innovative companies with relatively fewer patents get far less publicity 
for their patenting choices. The adoption of defensive patent strategies 
demonstrates the extent to which patentees can be influenced by others. 
What about publicizing quality rather than quantity-patenting strategies? 
Several of the most active companies in the patent arms race have 
come forward to criticize its cost and effectiveness. In the early 2000s, 
Sun Microsystems and Cisco were both engaged in rapid patent portfolio 
building. Sun subscribed to a strategy of growing its “patent stockpile[] to 
use if attacked or as a form of mutual deterrence.”342 Cisco filed for 
hundreds of patents each year in what they called “the only rational 
response” to the large number of patents in the industry.343 
Recently, however, both companies have changed course. In 2008, 
the General Counsel of Sun, Mike Dillon, announced on his blog that the 
firm had decided a few years prior to reduce its annual patent filings 
from 1000 to closer to 700, “a significant decline for Sun [which] occurs 
during a period in which we have more innovation than at any point in 
Sun’s history.”344 Rather than patenting “everything,” Dillon explained, 
the company had decided to file for fewer, more high-quality patents.345 
The move was motivated by the high costs of obtaining and maintaining 
patents and the realization that Sun’s business model only required 
enough patents to support its customers and to provide “a defensive 
response” as needed.346 Cisco’s General Counsel and Senior Vice 
President Mark Chandler made a similar statement, in late 2009, about 
the company’s patenting strategy. He remarked that Cisco had also 
decided to move away from the quantity strategy it had once pursued.347 
Like Sun, Cisco had reduced its filings to focus on quality, bringing down 
 
 341. Press Release, IBM, IBM Earns Most U.S. Patents for 17th Consecutive Year; Will Offer 
Licenses to Patent Portfolio Management Know-How (Jan. 17, 2010), http://www.ibm.com/news/bh/ 
en/2010/01/17/r544000b85854b33.html; Andrew Nusca, Microsoft Awarded 10,000th U.S. Patent, 
ZDNet (Feb. 10, 2009, 11:52 AM), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/sdrucker/press/btl.htm. 
 342. Mike Dillon, The Patent Arms Race, Legal Thing (May 26, 2008, 8:00 PM), 
http://blogs.sun.com/dillon/entry/the_patent_arms_race. 
 343. Competition FTC Hearing II, supra note 16, at 736 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President 
for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.). 
 344. Dillon, supra note 342. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Michael Arndt, Cisco’s Patent Strategy: It’s More Than Numbers, Bus. Wk. (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/next/archives/2009/12/has_the_recessi.html (“The arms race 
approach doesn’t pay off . . . It doesn’t do you a lot of good to have a lot of patents.” (quoting Mark 
Chandler, General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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the number of patent applications per year from 1000 to 700.348 While the 
30% reduction in the number of new filings reported by these two 
companies does not necessarily represent a huge change to business-as-
usual, the de-escalation in the patent arms race they represent is 
significant. 
In-depth case studies of how companies have made the transition 
towards quality patenting and of the financial savings realized, or of how 
companies can build smaller, smarter patent portfolios from the start 
could help increase patent quality. If more companies come forward and 
describe alternatives to the conventional high-volume, low-quality 
approach to portfolio patenting, others may catch on. Just as portfolio 
patenting begets more portfolio patenting, quality patenting may beget 
more quality patenting. 
2. Promote Fact-Based Licensing and Patenting 
Previous Parts describe how volume patenting is intimately tied to 
the practice of volume licensing. During licensing negotiations, if one 
party is focused on the number, not the quality, of the other party’s 
patents, it makes more sense for that party to acquire more low-quality 
rather than fewer high-quality patents. However, change the nature of 
licensing negotiations and the incentives for patenting will change as 
well. If other ways of measuring cross-coverage that do not rely primarily 
on the number of patents can be popularized, companies will have less of 
an incentive to “pad” their portfolios, since only those patents whose 
worth is proven will impact the negotiations. The best practices of 
companies or intermediaries who have developed such techniques should 
be publicized. The practice of “fact-based” rather than “volume” 
licensing could, in turn, effect a change in the way companies patent. 
In addition to fact-based licensing, fact-based patenting may also 
cause companies to rethink their patenting strategies. In their influential 
article, Opperman and Tan challenged companies to take examine the 
long-term financial costs associated with volume-patenting, as compared 
to quality-patenting.349 Their financial model suggests that, in the long 
run, volume-patenting costs more and provides less protection to 
companies’ patent portfolios than does quality-patenting. Companies 
should analyze whether or not their patent portfolios are really serving 
the purposes for which they have been acquired. The data in this Article 
suggest that large portfolios do not always succeed at one of their main 
objectives—keeping companies out of court. These types of internal 
evaluations may lead companies to pare down their patent portfolios. 
 
 348. Id. 
 349. Opperman & Tan, supra note 280. 
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C. Reducing Patent Hold-Up 
In today’s patent ecosystem, patents can no longer provide 
companies with freedom from hold-up. As a result, defensive strategies 
must be reconceptualized to include new tactics—including sharing 
information, prevention, disruption, and coordination—for securing 
freedom to operate. 
1. Sharing Information 
As has been described earlier, patentees use secrecy to increase 
hold-up, a term that refers to inflation in the bargaining power of a 
patentee due to choices made by the accused prior to the time of 
bargaining. It would be socially desirable to increase transparency to 
reduce these imbalances. At a systemic level, creating mechanisms to 
more easily track who owns which patents would go towards reaching 
that goal. However, this represents a hard problem, given the wide 
variety of ways in which patentees refer to themselves, the limited 
incentives companies have to record their patent assignments in a timely 
manner,350 and the large number of subsidiaries corporations have, all of 
which make it difficult to quantify a corporation’s complete patent 
holdings with certainty. How these obstacles to transparency can be 
overcome is worth further consideration. 
Privately, companies can “disarm” patent-assertion entities by 
sharing information about them with other targets. Information 
aggregator PatentFreedom has tried to do this by collecting information 
on the activities, techniques, and holdings of patent-assertion entities and 
splitting the cost among its members.351 A “community module” allows 
members to share additional information about patent-assertion entities, 
to find other members with shared interests, and to explore opportunities 
for collaboration and mutual defense.352 Others have called for the 
sharing of information via blogs and other free fora, such as was 
provided by the Patent Troll Tracker website.353 
Perhaps information about licenses and settlements could be shared 
more broadly—for example through a clearinghouse that would sanitize 
and remove any company-specific information. Having more data points 
regarding license negotiations and license terms could help rationalize 
them, which would aid courts in reasonable royalty determinations. As 
Lemley and Myhrvold note in their more general proposal to require 
 
 350. Recordation within three months provides rights against subsequent purchasers of a patent, 
but no other statutory benefits. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
 351. Research Methodology and Value Proposition, PatentFreedom, https://www.patentfreedom.com/ 
serviceofferings.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 352. Optional Core Module, PatentFreedom, https://www.patentfreedom.com/serviceofferings-
ocm.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 353. Fawcett & Chan, supra note 121, at 7–18. 
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publication of patent assignments and license terms, disclosure of patent 
information will make it “harder for a few unscrupulous patent owners to 
hold-up legitimate innovators.”354 
2. Limiting Patent Sales 
As has been discussed, practicing corporations increasingly have 
incentives to sell their unused patents to the marketplace. While 
privately beneficial, these acts increase the risk that the patents will be 
used to hold up practicing companies. Because of this, some have called 
on companies “not [to] sell arms to terrorists,” that is, to exclude patent-
assertion entities from their patent sales.355 Patentees may attempt to do 
this by attaching strings to the patent assets released by companies into 
the market or by excluding patent-assertion entities from the buying 
pool.356 However, in practice, controlling the downstream use of a patent 
is likely easier said than done. In addition, it is unrealistic to expect that 
companies will choose not to sell patents for the best price they can get 
for them merely on principle. Calls for companies to limit their sales 
could be accompanied by publicity that gives such companies public 
relations incentives not to engage in such sales. 
A better solution might be to leverage the self-interest of patentees 
by creating alternatives to sale. One kernel of an idea is to create a 
nonprofit organization that would allow companies to donate their 
patents and to realize a tax benefit accordingly. The nonprofit could then 
license the patents non-exclusively to the public, thereby allowing the 
patents to be used defensively, but not offensively, or simply retire them. 
Law firms could be engaged to do “IP audits” to identify unused assets 
and to apply proven accounting approaches to patent valuations. 
Another suggestion is to publicize the benefits of letting patents 
expire and how to identify good candidates for expiry. The cost savings 
from retiring patents can be substantial, reducing not only maintenance 
fees, but also the recordkeeping and administration needed to keep track 
of the patents, as well as the payments. Dow Chemical Company saved 
“millions of dollars annually by dropping non-strategic patents.”357 
Publicizing information about how to determine what patents to retire 
and the cost savings associated with retirement may lead companies to 
pare down their portfolios. 
3. Disruption 
There are several ways that a target can disrupt a patent-assertion 
entity’s campaign. One way is to call the patent’s validity into question 
by filing a request for inter partes reexamination. The effect of 
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reexamination is to cloud the rights associated with the patent and, in 
some cases, to suspend litigation at the district court.358 In 60% of the 
cases decided to date, the patent was canceled entirely,359 as compared to 
a 33% rate of patent invalidation at district court.360 In reexamination, 
the patent does not enjoy the presumption of validity it gets in litigation, 
contributing to this higher “kill rate.”361 The patentee has had to change 
the claims in 35% of reexamination cases to date, and in only 5% of 
cases have the patents emerged unscathed by the reexamination.362 
However, the reexamination process is risky, effectively precluding the 
target from later attempting to invalidate the patent in court.363 It is also 
lengthy, lasting on average 3.5 years without appeals and five-to-eight 
years with them.364 If the reexamination does not lead to a stay of 
pending litigation, its value is greatly diminished. Even if it does, the 
same cloud of uncertainty that hangs over the patent hangs over the 
target.  
If a threat letter is specific enough, a target can also initiate a 
declaratory judgment action.365 By beating the patent-assertion entity to 
court, the target can pick the venue and the timing of the litigation. Filing 
a declaratory judgment action also calls the plaintiff’s “bluff,” potentially 
forcing a patent-assertion entity with limited resources to underwrite a 
litigation for which it did not plan. 
 
 358. The likelihood of getting a stay varies from court to court. According to an analysis of recent 
published decisions, the Northern District of California granted stays 72% of the time (twenty-one out 
of twenty-nine stay requests) as compared to the Eastern District of Texas, which granted stays 46% of 
the time (eleven out of twenty-four stay requests). ThinkFire, supra note 112; see also Yar Chaikovsky, 
Presentation at the Advanced Patent Law Institute, Santa Clara: Reexamination and Litigation 23, 25 
(Dec. 2009) (copy on file with the author). 
 359. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data (2009) 
[hereinafter Inter Partes Filing Data], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/documents/ 
inter_partes.pdf. 
 360. Stephen B. Maebius & Leon Radomsky, A Case for Strategic Use of Re-Examination, Law 
360 (July 23, 2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/112760 (copy on file with the Hastings Law 
Journal). 
 361. See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 362. Inter Partes Filing Data, supra note 359. 
 363. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2006), 
A third-party requester whose request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order 
under section 313 is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in 
whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, the invalidity of any claim finally determined 
to be valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party requester raised or could 
have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.  
 364. Ralph Eckardt & Mark Blaxill, Inst. for Progress, Reexamining Inter Partes Reexam 
(2008). 
 365. Declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases is governed by Article III of the 
Constitution, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and most recently, by MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 
U.S. 118, 131 (2007) (holding that licensees do not have to breach their license before bringing 
declaratory judgment actions). 
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4. Coordinated Action 
One of the most important tactics for combating hold-up may be to 
join forces with other targets. There are several ways companies can do 
so, both generally and against specific threats. In the context of a lawsuit, 
for example, companies can band together by entering into joint defense 
agreements to invalidate a patent commonly asserted against them.366 
Companies can also share costs in initiating reexamination. 
The knowledge of the broader technical and legal community can 
also be leveraged to find prior art to invalidate patents. Several 
organizations have sprung up to engage in such “crowd-sourcing.” 
Article One Partners, which describes itself as the “world’s largest patent 
research community,”367 offers monetary rewards to people who submit 
the best prior art that affects a given patent.368 The company makes 
money through clients who fund the studies, and through public stock 
trades using the information gathered.369 The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (“EFF”)’s “most wanted” list features “bogus software 
patents” that it describes as “annoying and often dangerous legal 
weapons.”370 Related projects include PatentFizz,371 Peer-to-Patent,372 
Peer-to-Patent post-issue,373 and EFF’s own Patent Busting project.374 
The key challenges to coordination-based action include differences 
in the parties’ positions or decisionmaking processes, “free-riding” by 
parties who benefit from but do not contribute to the action, and the 
time and costs required to agree on and to implement a coordinated 
strategy.375 To effectively implement coordinated strategies, the parties 
need to “truly work together, not just when it is convenient for them to 
do so, but even when certain actions seem to contravene their own 
individual interests.”376 
 
 366. For a general overview of such agreements, see Thomas G. Pasternak & David R. Donoghue, 
Making Joint Defense Agreement Work, Litig., Summer 2008, at 26, 26. 
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Conclusion 
The patent environment has become significantly more complex in 
recent years. From relative obscurity, patent-assertion entities have 
become some of the patent system’s most active litigants. More and more 
patents are being bought and sold on the secondary market for patents, 
shifting emphasis from the patent “arms race” to the patent marketplace. 
Companies are taking advantage of the new opportunities the market 
presents. All of these developments have led to the creation of a more 
complex, heterogeneous patent ecosystem. 
An understanding of this new complex patent ecosystem represents 
a critical insight into the process of determining how best to fix the crisis 
in which many perceive the patent system currently to be.377 Without this 
context, proposed changes to the system by Congress, the USPTO, and 
the courts are unlikely to be successful and may backfire or lead to 
unintended consequences. The specific findings in this Article regarding 
how and how not to change the patent system are informed by the 
description of the new patent ecosystem provided above. As 
policymakers consider these and related proposals, they should consider 
the new realities of the patent ecosystem and, more broadly, the 
opportunities and threats they present to innovation. 
 
 377. For example, three of the most important titles about the patent system of the past decade 
have indicated the extent to which the patent system needs fixing. See generally James Bessen & 
Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at 
Risk (2008); Burk & Lemley, supra note 12; Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its 
Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and 
What to Do About It (2004). 
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